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ed by Barberà, Jackson and Neme
(1997) as the class of strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic rules, are
also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more
restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Keywords: Obvious Strategy-proofness; Sequential Allotment Rules; Division Problem;
Single-peaked Preferences.
JEL Classication: D71.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show that, in the division problem with single-peaked prefer-
ences, all sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof. We do it by constructing
an algorithm that, applied to each sequential allotment rule, denes an extensive game form
for which truth-telling is an obviously dominant strategy and it induces the rule.
A rule maps proles of agentspreferences into alternatives. A rule is strategy-proof
if, for each agent, truth-telling is always optimal, regardless of the preferences declared by
the other agents. Namely, at each prole of preferences and for each agent, to declare the
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true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy in the game in normal form induced by the
rule at the given (true) prole. To deal with the concern of how easy it is for an agent to
identify that truth-telling is indeed weakly dominant (i.e., how much contingent reasoning
is required to do so), Li (2017) proposes the stronger notion of obvious strategy-proofness
(OSP).
In this paper we show that, for the discrete division problem with single-peaked prefer-
ences, the set of sequential allotment rules coincides with the class of all obviously strategy-
proof, e¢ cient and restricted monotonic rules. And hence, under e¢ ciency and restricted
monotonicity, the requirements of strategy-proofness and obvious strategy-proofness do co-
incide.
The continuous division problem with single-peaked preferences, proposed and studied
by Sprumont (1991), is as follows. A given amount of a perfectly divisible good has to be
allotted among a set of agents that have single-peaked preferences over the set of possible
shares.1 Sprumont (1991) characterizes the uniform allocation rule as the unique one sat-
isfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency and anonymity. Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997)
studies non-anonymous rules and shows that the class of all strategy-proof, e¢ cient and
replacement monotonic rules coincides with the large family of sequential allotment rules.2
In general, a rule is obviously strategy-proof if there is an extensive game form, whose
set of players is the set of agents and its outcomes are the alternatives, with two additional
features. First, for any given prole of preferences, one can identify a prole of truth-telling
behavioral strategies such that, if played, the outcome of the game is the alternative that
the rule would select at the prole of preferences. Second, for each prole of preferences,
truth-telling is an obviously dominant strategy; namely, for each agent, for each non truthful
behavioral strategy, and for each information set that is an earliest point of departure with
the truth-telling strategy (i) the agent evaluates the consequence of behaving according to
truth-telling in a pessimistic way (thinking that the worse possible outcome will happen),
(ii) the agent evaluates the consequence of behaving according to the non truthful strategy
in an optimistic way (thinking that the best possible outcome will happen), and (iii) the
pessimistic alternative associated to the truth-telling strategy is at least as good as the
optimistic alternative associated to the non truthful strategy. Hence, whenever the agent
has to play along the game, the action prescribed by the truth-telling strategy appears as
1For instance, situations where the good is a xed number of assets in a bankruptcy, or rationed con-
sumption bundles traded at xed prices, or a surplus of a joint project, or a cost of a public project, or a
total working time required to complete a task, and so on. In the discrete version of the division problem the
amount of the good to be allotted comes in indivisible units and agents can only receive integer amounts.
In the Final Remarks section at the end of the paper we explain the technical reason why we consider here
the discrete version of the continuous Sprumont (1991)s model.
2A rule is replacement monotonic if whenever the allotment of an agent changes after a change in his/her
reported preferences, then all the other agentsallotments change in the same direction: either all increase
or all decrease.
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unmistakably optimal; i.e. obviously dominant. Mackenzie (2018) gives a general revelation
principle like result for obviously strategy-proof implementation, upon which we will base
our result.3 Mackenzie (2018) shows that when looking for an extensive game form to OSP-
implement a particular rule, one can restrict attention without loss of generality to the
class of round table mechanisms. Those are extensive game forms with perfect information
in which each agent, when playing along the game, is required to publicly reveal partial
information about his/her preferences. Moreover, it is su¢ cient to require that, in the
round table mechanism, truth-telling be a weakly dominant strategy.
At the light of the extreme behavioral criterion used to evaluate truth-telling, it is not
surprising that the literature has already identied settings for which either none of the
strategy-proof rules are obviously strategy-proof or only a very special and small subset
of them satisfy the stronger requirement. For instance, in the complete impossibility case,
Li (2017) already shows that the rule associated to the top-trading cycles algorithm in
the house allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf (1974) is not obviously strategy-proof.
Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) shows that the rule associated to the deferred acceptance
algorithm is not obviously strategy-proof for the agents belonging to the o¤ering side. In the
partial (or total) possibility case, Li (2017) characterizes the monotone price mechanisms
(generalizations of ascending auctions) as those that implement all obviously strategy-proof
rules on the domain of quasi-linear preferences. Li (2017) also shows that, for online adver-
tising auctions, the rule induced by the mechanism that selects the e¢ cient allocation and
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment is obviously strategy-proof. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski
(2018) shows however that the rule associated to the deferred acceptance algorithm becomes
obviously strategy-proof on the restricted domain of acyclic preferences introduced by Ergin
(2002).4
Despite the fact that in many settings obvious strategy-proofness becomes signicantly
more restrictive than just strategy-proofness, we surprisingly nd that, for the discrete
division problem with single-peaked preferences, each sequential allotment rule (i.e., each
strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic rule) is indeed obviously strategy-proof.
We show it by exhibiting, for each sequential allotment rule, the extensive game form with
perfect information that OSP-implements the rule. The construction of the game is done
by an algorithm with two phases.
The specic phase of the algorithm only deals with sequential allotment rules that also
satisfy individual rationality with respect to a reference allotment q = (q1; : : : ; qn), where n
is the number of agents and q (which depends on the rule) is feasible (i.e., q1+   + qn = k,
where k is the total number of units of the good that has to be allotted). This property
3Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) rst noted and used this revelation principal in the context of matching
rules.
4For other partially positive or revelation principle like results see also Arribillaga, Massó and Neme
(2018), Bade and Gonczarowski (2017), Pycia and Troyan (2018) and Troyan (2018).
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requires that, at every prole, the rule should assign to each agent i an allotment that is
at least as preferred as is reference allotment qi. Consider a sequential allotment rule that
is individually rational with respect to q. Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) shows that
q is the allotment chosen by the rule at the two extreme proles where either all agents
want to receive k units or all want to receive 0. But the reference allotment q will not
be e¢ cient at most proles. The proposed extensive game form that OSP-implements a
given sequential allotment rule is designed to identify (in a parsimonious way, in order to
guarantee obvious strategy-proofness) sequences of Pareto improvements that require only
changes with opposite signs of one unit of the good for two agents. And this is done by
means of the specic algorithm that has two stages. In Stage 1, and given the reference
allotment q, agents are asked sequentially (and have to answer publicly) whether they would
like to receive an allotment that is smaller, equal or larger than their corresponding reference
allotment. If one of the sets of agents who want to receive more or want to receive less is
empty, then the game ends with outcome q (an e¢ cient allotment, if agents tell the truth).
Otherwise (namely, when both sets are non-empty), the algorithm moves to Stage 2 with
input q and the partition of the set of agents into the subsets of agents that want to receive
more, less or equal amount of the good than that of their reference allotment. The purpose
of each generic step in Stage 2 is to identify two agents, agent i who wants to receive more
than qi and agent j who wants to receive less than qj, and a new allotment q0 (output of
the step) that constitutes a Pareto improvement with respect to q (if agents tell the truth)
with the property that q0i = qi + 1; q
0
j = qj   1 and all the other components of q0 are equal
to those in q: Along the di¤erent steps in Stage 2, the reference allotment and the agents
partition are updated appropriately. The game ends, with the current reference allotment
as its outcome, at the step where one of the sets of agents who want to receive more or want
to receive less is empty (and so, no Pareto improvement is possible).
The general phase of the algorithm, used to deal with sequential allotment rules that
are not individually rational with respect to any reference allotment, contains a procedure
to identify a single reference allotment q in an iterative way. It starts from two extreme
allotments, the one that the rule would select if all agents wanted to receive k units and the
the other if all wanted to receive 0. Then, and once this allotment q is identied, the game
proceeds according to the specic phase of the algorithm using q as the reference allotment.
This paper contributes to the obviously strategy-proof implementation literature by
showing that, in a well known setting with a large the class of well behaved strategy-
proof rules, all of them are in addition obviously strategy-proof. Namely, although obvious
strategy-proofness is more restrictive than just strategy-proofness, this may not be always
the case. Thus, the perception that obvious strategy-proofness is not a very appealing notion
because it is too restrictive, should be taken with a certain caution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic notation and denitions.
Section 3 presents the notion of obvious strategy-proofness. Section 4 contains, for each
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sequential allotment rule, the denition of the extensive game form that OSP-implements it
and an example illustrating the algorithm. Sections 5 contains three nal remarks. Appen-
dix 1 in Section 6 collects the proofs omitted in the main text and Appendix 2 in Section 7
presents the formal denition of a sequential allotment rule and an example illustrating its
denition.
2 Preliminaries
Agents are the elements of a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng, where n  2. They have to share
k 2 N+ units of a good, where N+ is the set of positive integers, each unit is indivisible and
k  2. An allotment is a vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 f0; : : : ; kgn such that
Pn
i=1 xi = k.
Let X be the set of allotments. Each agent i 2 N has complete preferences Ri over
f0; : : : ; kg, the set of is possible allotments. Let Pi be the strict preferences associated
with Ri. The preferences Ri are single-peaked if they have a unique most-preferred share
(Ri) 2 f0; : : : ; kg, the top of Ri, such that (Ri)Pixi for all xi 2 f0; : : : ; kgnf(Ri)g and for
any pair yi; xi 2 f0; : : : ; kg, yi < xi <  (Ri) or  (Ri) < xi < yi implies xiPiyi. We assume
that agents have single-peaked preferences. Often, the relevant information of Ri will be its
top (Ri) and if Ri is obvious from the context we will refer to it by  i: We denote by 0, 1
and k the vectors (0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1); (k; : : : ; k) 2 f0; : : : ; kgn and, given S  N , by 0S; 1S
and kS the corresponding subvectors where all agents in S receive the allotment 0; 1 and k:
Moreover, for a vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 f0; : : : ; kgn we denote by xS the subvector (xi)i2S
and by (x  1)S the subvector (xi   1)i2S:
Let R the set of all single-peaked preferences over f0; : : : ; kg: Proles (of preferences)
are n-tuples of single-peaked preferences over f0; : : : ; kg, one for each agent, and they are
denoted by R = (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 Rn. When we want to stress the role of agent is preferences
we will represent a prole R by (Ri; R i) and by (RS; R S) if we want to stress the role of
the preferences of agents in S.
A discrete division problem is a pair (N; k), where N is the set of agents, k is the
number of units of the good that have to be allotted among the agents in N , and agents
have single-peaked preferences over f0; : : : ; kg:
A solution of the discrete division problem (N; k) is a rule that selects, for each prole,
an allotment. Namely, a rule is a function  : Rn ! X; that is, Pi2N i(R) = k for all
R 2 Rn:
A desirable requirement on rules is e¢ ciency in the sense that, for each prole, the
selected allotment should be e¢ cient. Namely, for each R 2 Rn, there is no y 2 X such
that yiRii(R) for all i 2 N and yjPjj(R) for at least one j 2 N . It is easy to check that,
by single-peakedness, e¢ ciency of  is equivalent to the property of same-sidedness which
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requires that, for each R 2 Rn;
if
P
j2N (Rj)  k then i(R)  (Ri) for all i 2 N (1)
and
if
P
j2N (Rj)  k then i(R)  (Ri) for all i 2 N: (2)
Rules require agents to report single-peaked preferences over f0; : : : ; kg. A rule is
strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of agents to truthfully reveal their prefer-
ences; namely, for each prole and each agent, the true preferences are weakly dominant in
the normal form game induced by the rule at the prole. Namely, a rule  : Rn ! X is
strategy-proof if for all R 2 Rn, all i 2 N and all R0i 2 R;
i(Ri; R i)Rii(R0i; R i):
We will say that agent i 2 N manipulates the rule  : Rn ! X at R 2 Rn with R0i 2 R if
i(R
0
i; R i)Pii(Ri; R i):
Obviously, a rule  : Rn ! X is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it.
We will restrict our attention to rules that satisfy the simplicity requirement of depending
only on the prole of top allotments. Formally, a rule  : Rn ! X is tops-only if for all
R;R0 2 Rn such that (Ri) = (R0i) for all i 2 N; (R) = (R0): Hence, and abusing
notation, a tops-only rule  : Rn ! X can be written as  : f0; : : : ; kgn ! X: Accordingly,
we will often use the notation ( 1; : : : ; n) interchangeably with (R1; : : : ; Rn):
A rule is individually rational with respect to an allotment q 2 X if it guarantees that
each agent i receives an allotment that is weakly preferred to qi: Namely, a rule  : Rn ! X
is individually rational with respect to an allotment q 2 X if, for all R 2 Rn and i 2 N ,
i(R)Riqi:
Sprumont (1991) denes the continuous version of the division problem, where the good
is completely divisible, the total amount to be allotted is a real number k > 0, agents have
single-peaked preferences over the interval of real numbers [0; k] and the set of allocations
is
X = fx = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 [0; k]n j
Pn
i=1 xi = kg:
The denition of a rule in the discrete division problem, as well as the properties dened
above, can be straightforwardly translated to the continuous case. However, the property
of equal treatment of equals (implied by anonymity) is not useful in the discrete case. For
instance, for k = 3, n = 2 and (R1) = (R2) there is no allotment with integer values
where the two agents receive the same amount.5
5Herrero and Martínez (2011) proposes and studies the property of balancedness, as a constrained
anonymity notion. A rule is balanced if whenever two agents report the same preferences their allotments
di¤er at most by one unit.
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Replacement monotonicity imposes a minimal symmetry property on how rules treat
agents. It requires that if an agent, by changing the revealed preferences, obtains a di¤erent
allotment then all other agentsallotments should change in the same direction. Namely, a
rule  : Rn ! X is replacement monotonic if, for all R 2 Rn, i 2 N , and R0i 2 R,
i(Ri; R i)  i(R0i; R i) implies j(Ri; R i)  j(R0i; R i) for all j 6= i:
For the continuous division problem, Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) characterizes
the set of all sequential allotment rules as the class of all strategy-proof, e¢ cient and re-
placement monotonic rules.6 The proof of this statement can be adapted to the discrete
division problem and for further reference, we state this characterization (and the one adding
individual rationality) as Proposition 1.7
Proposition 1 (Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997)) Let (N; k) be a discrete division
problem. Then, a rule  : Rn ! X is strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic if
and only if  is a sequential allotment rule. Moreover, a rule  : Rn ! X is strategy-proof,
e¢ cient, replacement monotonic and individually rational with respect to q if and only if 
is a sequential allotment rule such that (0) = (k) = q:
3 Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation
We briey describe the notion of obvious strategy-proofness. Li (2017) proposes this notion
with the aim of reducing the contingent reasoning that agents have to carry out to identify,
given a rule and a prole, that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in the direct rev-
elation mechanism (i.e., the game in normal form associated to the rule and the prole). A
rule  is obviously strategy-proof if there exists an extensive game form with two properties.
First, for each prole R = (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 Rn one can identify a behavioral strategy prole,
associated to truth-telling, such that if agents play the game according to such strategy
the outcome is (R); the allotment selected by the rule  at R; that is, the game induces
. Second, whenever agent i with preferences Ri has to play in the game, i evaluates the
consequence of choosing the action prescribed by is truth-telling strategy according to the
worse possible outcome, among all outcomes that may occur as an e¤ect of later actions
made by agents along the rest of the game. In contrast, i evaluates the consequence of
6Appendix 2 in Section 7 at the end of the paper contains a formal denition of a sequential allotment
rule. Our implementation result will not use explicitly the denition of  as a sequential allotment rule,
but rather it will use its properties and the images of  at some specic proles.
7The proof in Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) is based in Sprumont (1991)s Lemma 1 stating that
e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness imply continuity, and the fact that strategy-proofness and continuity imply
tops-onlyness. It is possible to show that in the discrete division problem e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness and
replacement monotonicity imply directly tops-onlyness. And then, the proof for the discrete division problem
proceeds as in the continuous case.
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choosing an action di¤erent from the one prescribed by is truth-telling strategy according
to the best possible outcome, among all outcomes that may occur again as an e¤ect of later
actions along the rest of the game. Then, is truth-telling strategy is obviously dominant in
the game if, whenever i has to play, its pessimistic outcome is at least as preferred as the
optimistic outcome associated to any other strategy. If the game induces  and for each
agent truth-telling is obviously dominant; then  is obviously strategy-proof.
For our context, two important simplications related to obvious strategy-proofness have
been identied in the literature that follows Li (2017). First, without loss of generality we
can assume that the extensive game form that induces the rule has perfect information (see
Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) and Mackenzie (2018)). Second, the new notion of obvious
strategy-proofness can be fully captured by the classical notion of strategy-proofness applied
to extensive form games with perfect information. This last observation follows from the fact
that, the best possible outcome obtained when agent i chooses an action di¤erent from the
one prescribed by is truth-telling strategy and the worst possible outcome obtained when
agent i chooses the action prescribed by is truth-telling strategy, are both obtained with only
one behavioral strategy prole of the other agents, because the perfect information implies
that all information sets are singleton sets (and each one belongs either to the subgame that
follows the truth-telling choice or else to the subgame that follows the alternative choice).8
Then, for easy presentation and following this literature, we will say that a rule is obviously
strategy-proof if it is implemented by an extensive game form with perfect information for
which truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy (see Denition 1 below). We present the
notion of extensive game form that will be used here to state and prove our results.
An extensive game form with perfect information associated to a discrete division prob-
lem (N; k) consists of the following elements.
1. A nite and partially ordered set of histories (H;), where:
(a) ; 2 H is the empty history for which ;  h for all h 2 Hnf;g:
(b) For each h 2 Hnf;g; there is a unique h0 2 H, the immediate predecessor
of h, such that h0  h and there is no h such that h0  h  h: We write
it as h0 im h: A history h such that ; im h has length 1, and the integer
t  2 is the length of history h if there is a sequence h1; : : : ; ht 1 2 H such that
; im h1 im    im ht 1 im h.
(c) H can be partitioned into two sets, the set of terminal histories HT = fh 2
H jthere is no h 2 H such that h  hg and the set of non-terminal histories
HNT = fh 2 H jthere is h 2 H such that h  hg.
8Mackenzie (2018) formally proves this statement for a special class of extensive form games with perfect
information, called round table mechanisms, but the proof can be adapted to any extensive game form with
perfect information.
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2. A mapping N : HNT ! N that assigns to each non-terminal history h 2 HNT the
agent N (h) that has to play at h: Given i 2 N , dene Hi = fh 2 HNT j N (h) = ig
as the set of histories at which i has to play. For h 2 HNT ; we will often denote by ih
the agent N (h) = i that plays at h:
3. A set of actions A and a correspondence A : HNT  Anf;g where, for each h 2 HNT ,
A(h) is the non-empty set of actions available to player N (h) at h:
4. An outcome function o : HT ! X that assigns an allotment o(h) 2 X to each terminal
history h 2 HT .
An extensive game form with perfect information (or simply, a game) associated to the
discrete division problem (N; k) is a six-tuple   = (N; k; (H;) ;N ;A; o) with the above
properties.9 The set of agents N and the integer k will be xed throughout the paper. Let
G be the class of all games satisfying conditions 1 to 4 above.10
Fix a game   2 G and an agent i 2 N: A (behavioral and pure) strategy of i in   is
a function i : Hi ! A such that, for each h 2 Hi; i(h) 2 A(h); namely, i selects at
each history h where i has to play one of is available actions at h. Let i be the set of is
strategies in  : A strategy prole  = (1; : : : ; n) 2 1      n =  is an ordered list
of strategies, one for each agent. Given i 2 N;  2  and 0i 2 i we often write (0i;  i)
to denote the strategy prole where i is replaced in  by 0i: Let h
 (h; ) be the terminal
history that results in   when agents start playing at h 2 HNT according to  2 .
Fix a game   2 G and preferences Ri 2 R. A strategy i is weakly dominant in   at Ri
if, for all  i and all 0i,
oi(h
 (;; ))Rioi(h (;; (0i;  i))):
We are now ready to dene obvious strategy-proofness in the context of the discrete
division problem.
Denition 1 Let (N; k) be given. A rule  : Rn ! X is obviously strategy-proof if there
is an extensive game form   2 G associated to (N; k) such that:
(i) for each R 2 Rn, there exists a strategy prole R = (R11 ; : : : ; Rnn ) 2  such that
(R) = o(h (;; R)),
9Note that the set of actions A is embedded in the denition of A. Moreover,   is not yet a game in
extensive form because agentspreferences over allotments are still missing. But given a game   and a
prole R; the pair ( ; R) is the game in extensive form where each agent i uses Ri to evaluate is allotments,
associated to terminal histories, induced by strategy proles.
10According to Mackenzie (2018) a game   2 G is a round table mechanism if the set of actions A is the
family of non-empty subsets of preferences 2R and (a) the set of actions at any history are disjoint subsets
of preferences, (b) when a player has to play for the rst time the set of actions is a partition of R, and
(c) later, the union of actions at history h is the intersection of the actions taken by agent N (h) at all
predecessors that lead to h.
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(ii) for all i 2 N and all Ri 2 R; Rii is weakly dominant in   at Ri.
When (i) holds we say that   induces : When (i) and (ii) hold we say that   OSP-
implements  and refer to Rii as is truth-telling strategy.
Our main result here is to show that in the two statements of Proposition 1 strategy-
proofness can be replaced by obvious strategy-proofness. But more importantly, we do it
by constructing, for each sequential allotment rule  : Rn ! X; the extensive game form  
that OSP-implements .
4 The Extensive Game Form
Given a sequential allotment rule ; our construction of the game   is based on an algorithm
with two phases. The specic phase has to be used when  is individually rational with
respect to some q 2 X; and so (0) = (k) = q: The general phase, to be used when
(0) = q 6= q = (k), starts by modifying unit by unit q and q until they converge (in a
nite number of steps) to a unique q. Then, the specic phase is applied, after performing
a small adjustment to incorporate information about agents preferences that have already
been disclosed along the process of modifying the two reference allotments q and q towards
the unique reference allotment q.
4.1 The Individually Rational Case
Let  : Rn ! X be a sequential allotment rule satisfying individual rationality with respect
to the allotment q 2 X: The extensive game form   that OSP-implements  is constructed
by the specic phase of the algorithm that has two stages.
Stage 1 uses the reference allotment q as input information. Its objective is to partition
the set of agents into three subsets (up to two of them could be empty). To do so, agents
are asked sequentially (given a predetermined linear order < on N), and answer publicly,
whether they would like to receive strictly more than their allotment in q (denote the set of
such agents by Nu, where u refers to up), strictly less than their allotment in q (denote the
set of such agents by Nd, where d refers to down) or exactly their allotment in q (denote
the set of such agents by Ns, where s refers to stay). If at the end of Stage 1 one of the
two subsets Nu or Nd is empty, then the game ends with outcome q:
Otherwise (namely, if at the end of Stage 1 the subsets Nu and Nd are both non-
empty), the algorithm moves to Stage 2 with the history of actions chosen by agents along
Stage 1 as input, and q and the partition N = Nu [ Nd [ Ns as input information. The
objective of each generic step t in Stage 2 is to identify two agents, i00 2 Nu and i0 2 Nd,
and a new allotment q0 that would constitute a Pareto improvement (if agents told the
truth) with respect to q; an input information of the step.11 The identication of these
11To simplify the verbal argument, we only describe here the case t = 1:
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two agents is done sequentially but in a linked way: the choice of i0 2 Nd depends on
the previously chosen agent i00 2 Nu: Moreover, they are identied by evaluating  at two
somehow extreme proles that will be dened below. Along the di¤erent steps in Stage 2,
the reference allotment q is updated to q0, by setting
q0i =
8><>:
qi + 1 if i = i00
qi   1 if i = i0
qi if i =2 fi00; i0g;
and the sets Nu; Nd and Ns are also updated depending on the actions taken by i00 and
i0. The algorithm stops at the step where one of the two subsets Nu or Nd is empty with
the current allotment as its outcome. We now describe in detail the specic phase of the
algorithm.
4.1.1 The Specic Phase of the Algorithm
Input: A sequential allotment rule  satisfying individual rationality with respect to q 2 X
and a linear order < on the set of agents that, without loss of generality, we assume 1 <
   < n:
Set h0 = ; and q; = q. Go to Stage 1 with input h0 = ; and collect q; and N; = N;u =
N;d = N
;
s = ; as input information.
Stage 1: Go to the initialization step, Step 1.0.
Step 1.0:
Input of Step 1.0: The empty history h0 = ;.
Input information of Step 1.0: q; and N; = N;u = N
;
d = N
;
s = ;:
Dene i; = 1:
Agent i; has to choose an action from the set
A;
i; = fd; q;i; ; ug:12
Let ai; 2 A;i; be the choice of i;. To homogenize the description of the sets of actions in
di¤erent steps of the algorithm, and in order to interpret correctly the action ai;, we identify
(as being the same actions) u with k if q;
i; = k and d with 0 if q
;
i; = 0:
13 To do so, dene
ai; =
8><>:
k if q;
i; = k and ai; 2 fu; q;i;g
0 if q;
i; = 0 and ai; 2 fd; q;i;g
ai; otherwise.
12The set of available actions A;
i; (when i
; plays for the rst time) can be seen as a partition of R by
identifying action u as the subset fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) > q;i;g, action d as the subset fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) < q;i;g
and action q;
i; as the subset fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) = q;i;g. Observe that when either q;i; = k or q;i; = 0 this
partition has only two subsets: fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) = kg and fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) < kg when q;i; = k, or
fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) = 0g and fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) > 0g when q;i; = 0.
13This identication also ensures that the sets of actions satisfy the conditions of a round table mechanism.
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Set h = (;; ai;) and dene
Nhu =
(
fi;g if ai; = u
; otherwise, N
h
d =
(
fi;g if ai; = d
; otherwise, N
h
s =
(
fi;g if ai; = q;i;
; otherwise,
Nh = Nhu [Nhd [Nhs , and qh = q;:
Set h0 := h as output of Step 1.0. Go to Step 1.1 with input h0 and collect qh0 and
Nh
0
; Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s as input information.
Step 1.t (t 1):
Input of Step 1.t: h0, the output of Step 1.t-1 or Stage B (of the generic phase of the
algorithm, to be dened later).
Input information of Step 1.t: qh0 and Nh0 ; Nh0u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s (with N
h0 6= N).
Dene ih
0
= min<fi 2 N j i =2 Nh0g:
Agent ih
0
has to choose an action from the set
Ah
0
ih
0 = fd; qh0
ih
0 ; ug:
Let aih0 2 Ah0ih0 be the choice of ih
0
and, as we have done in Step 1.0, dene
aih0 =
8><>:
k if qh
0
ih
0 = k and aih0 2 fu; qh0ih0g
0 if qh
0
ih
0 = 0 and aih0 2 fd; qh0ih0g
aih0 otherwise.
Set h = (h0; aih0 ) and dene
Nhu =
(
Nh
0
u [ fih0g if aih0 = u
Nh
0
u otherwise,
Nhd =
(
Nh
0
d [ fih0g if aih0 = d
Nh
0
d otherwise,
Nhs =
(
Nh
0
s [ fih0g if aih0 = qh0ih0
Nh
0
s otherwise,
Nh = Nhu [Nhd [Nhs , and qh = qh
0
:
If Nh 6= N; set h0 := h as the output of Step 1.t. Go to Step 1.t+1 with input h0 and
collect qh
0
and Nh
0
; Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s as input information. Proceed until at some Step 1.t
0,
Nh = N holds.
If Nh = N and one of the two subsets Nhu or N
h
d is empty, then the history h is terminal
and the allotment qh is the outcome associated to h (i.e., set o(h) = qh).
If Nh = N , Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;; set h00 := h as the output of Stage 1. Go to Stage 2
with input h00 and collect qh
00
and Nh
00
u , N
h00
d , N
h00
s as input information.
Stage 2: Go to Step 2.1.a.
Step 2.t.a (t 1):
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Input of Step 2.t.a: h00. If t= 1, h00 is the output of either Stage 1 or Stage A (in the
generic phase of the algorithm, to be dened later). If t> 1, h00 is the output of Step
2.t-1.b.
Input information of Step 2.t.a: qh00 and Nh00u , N
h00
d , N
h00
s (with N
h00
u 6= ; and Nh00d 6= ;).
Notice that i 2 Nh00u implies qh00i < k and i 2 Nh00d implies 0 < qh00i .
Dene
ih
00
= min
<
fj 2 Nh00u j j(kNh00u ; (qh
00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
)  qh00j + 1g:14
Agent ih
00
has to choose an action from the set
Ah
00
ih
00 = fqh00
ih
00 + 1; ug:
Let aih00 2 Ah00ih00 be the choice of ih
00
and, as we have done previously, dene
aih00 =
(
k if qh
00
ih00 + 1 = k
aih00 otherwise.
Set h0 = (h00; aih00 ) and dene
Nh
0
u =
(
Nh
00
u if aih00 = u
Nh
00
u nfih00g otherwise,
Nh
0
d = N
h00
d , N
h0
s = Nn(Nh
0
u [Nh
0
d ) and q
h0 = qh
00
:
Let h0 be the output of Step 2.t.a. Go to Step 2.t.b with input h0 and collect qh0 ; ih00
and Nh
0
u , N
h0
d , N
h0
s as input information.
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Step 2.t.b (t 1):
Input of Step 2.t.b: h0, output of Step 2.t.a.
Input information of Step 2.t.b: qh0, ih00 and Nh0u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s (with N
h0
d 6= ;). Notice that
i 2 Nh0d implies 0 < qh0i .
Dene
ih
0
= min
<
fj 2 Nh0d j j(qh
0
ih
00 + 1;0Nh0d
; qh
0
 Nh0d [fih00g
)  qh0j   1g:16
Agent ih
0
has to choose an action from the set
Ah
0
ih
0 = fd; qh0
ih0   1g:
14The proof of Statement 1.1 in Appendix 1 guarantees that, as a consequence of the e¢ ciency of , ih
00
is well dened.
15Notice that Step 2.t.b (which identies the agent that would like to receive strictly less than his
reference allotment at h0) will require the previous identication of ih
00
in Step 2.t.a, the agent that would
like to receive strictly more than his reference allotment at h00.
16The proof of Statement 1.1 in Appendix 1 guarantees that, as a consequence of the e¢ ciency of , ih
0
is well dened.
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Let aih0 2 Ah0ih0 be the choice of ih
0
and, as we have done previously, dene
aih0 =
(
0 if qh
0
ih0   1 = 0
aih0 otherwise.
Set h = (h0; aih0 ) and dene
Nhu = N
h0
u ; N
h
d =
(
Nh
0
d if aih0 = d
Nh
0
d nfih0g otherwise,
Nhs = Nn(Nhu [Nhd ), and
qhj =
8><>:
qh
0
j + 1 if j = i
h00
qh
0
j   1 if j = ih0
qh
0
j if j 2 Nnfih00 ; ih0g:
Let h be the output of Step 2.t.b and collect qh and Nhu , N
h
d , N
h
s as output information.
If Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;, set h00 := h. Go to Step 2.t+1.a with input h00 and collect qh00
and Nh
00
u , N
h00
d , N
h00
s as input information.
Proceed until at some Step 2.t0.b one of the two subsets Nhu or N
h
d is empty. Then, the
history h is terminal and the allotment qh is the outcome associated to h (i.e., set o(h) = qh).
End of the Specic Phase of the Algorithm.
Let  be a sequential allotment rule satisfying individual rationality with respect to
q. We denote by   = (N; k; (H;) ;N ;A; o) the extensive game form obtained from the
specic phase of the algorithm, where ((H;) ;N ;A; o) are dened in an obvious way.
Let Ri 2 R be arbitrary and let  i = (Ri):We dene is truth-telling strategy Rii 2 i
relative to Ri in   by looking at each history h at which i plays at h; that is, i = ih (i.e.,
N (h) = i).
If h is a history in Stage 1; then Ahi = fd; qhi ; ug and
Rii (h) =
8><>:
u if  i > qhi
qhi if  i = q
h
i
d if  i < qhi ;
(3)
where qh is an input information of one step in Stage 1, and it remains constant and equal
to q.
If i plays at h in Stage 2 and i 2 Nhu ; then Ahi = fqhi + 1; ug and
Rii (h) =
(
u if  i > qhi + 1
qhi + 1 if  i  qhi + 1;
(4)
where qh is an input information of one Step 2.t.a.
If i plays at h in Stage 2 and i 2 Nhd ; then Ahi = fd; qhi   1g and
Rii (h) =
(
qhi   1 if  i  qhi   1
d if  i < qhi   1;
(5)
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where qh is an input information of one Step 2.t.b.
When we say that   OSP-implements , condition (i) in Denition 1 (applied to a
prole R 2 Rn) refers to the truth-telling strategy prole R = (R11 ; : : : ; Rnn ) 2  dened
in (3), (4) and (5) above.
Now we can state our result for individually rational allotment rules.
Theorem 1 Let  be a sequential allotment rule satisfying individual rationality with
respect to q. Then, the extensive game form   OSP-implements .
Proof See Subsection 6.1 in Appendix 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of establishing that three statements are true. In the
proof of Statement 1.1 we show that   is nite and that all agents that are called to play
along the specic phase of the algorithm are uniquely identied and well dened. In the
proof of Statement 2.1 we show that   induces  by verifying that, for any arbitrary prole
of tops  , () coincides with the nal reference allotment qh

, outcome of  . We do so by
establishing that, for every i, there is a relationship between  i and qh

i that depends on the
nal subset of agents to which i belongs to: if i 2 Nhs then  i = qhi , if i 2 Nhu then  i > qhi
and if i 2 Nhd then  i < qhi . In the proof of Statement 3.1 we show that truth-telling is
weakly dominant in  :We do so by showing that whenever i is called to play, at history h
with reference allotment qi, is truth-telling action triggers the right evolution of is future
reference allotment q0i : q
0
i = qi if i chooses qi and enters N
h
s ; q
0
i > qi if i chooses up and
enters or remains in Nhu and q
0
i < qi if i chooses down and enters or remains in N
h
d ; these
arguments are specic to whether h is an input of Step 1.t, Step 2.t.a or Step 2.t.b.
4.2 The General Case
Let  : Rn ! X be a sequential allotment rule. If (0) = (k) = q; then  is individually
rational with respect to the allotment q and, to dene the game  , we use the specic phase
of the algorithm dened in the previous subsection. Otherwise, the algorithm consists of
a general phase with two stages, Stage A and Stage B. Stage A transforms the two
allotments q = (0) and q = (k) into a unique allotment q by updating them along a
nite sequence of steps. Agents that play along these steps are nally classied into three
subsets, the subset of agents that would like to receive strictly more than their allotment in
q (denoted by Nu), strictly less than their allotment in q (denoted by Nd) or exactly their
allotment in q (denoted by Ns). Observe that the union of these three subsets may be a
strict subset of N because some agents may not play along Stage A; the convergence of qs
and qs to q does not require it (for example if q
i
= qi, agent i does not play in Stage A). To
sort out in one of the three subsets the agents that have not played yet, Stage B proceeds
as Stage 1 of the specic phase of the algorithm (starting at some Step 1.t, where t is
equal to the number of agents that have already played in Stage A) for the case of a rule
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that is individually rational with respect to q. We now describe in detail the general phase
of the algorithm.
4.2.1 The General Phase of the Algorithm
Input: A sequential allotment rule  and a linear order < on the set of agents that, without
loss of generality, we assume 1 <    < n:
Dene
q = (0) and q = (k):
If q = q; set q = q = q. Then,  is individually rational with respect to q and proceed
by applying to  and q the specic phase of the algorithm for individually rational rules.
If q 6= q, set h = ;, q; = q; and q; = q. Go to Stage A with input h = ; and collect
(q;; q;) and N; = N;d = N
;
u = N
;
s = ; as input information.
Stage A: Go to the initialization step, Step A.0.
Step A.0:
Input of Step A.0: The empty history h = ;:
Input information of Step A.0: (q;; q;) and N; = N;d = N
;
u = N
;
s = ;.
Dene i; = min<fi 2 N j q;i < q;i g:
Agent i; has to choose an action from the set
A;
i; = fd; q;i; ; : : : ; q;i; ; ug:17
Let ai; 2 A;i; be the choice of i;: Similarly, as we did in the specic phase of the algorithm,
we identify (as being the same actions) u with k if q;
i; = k and d with 0 if q
;
i;
= 0: To do so,
dene
ai; =
8><>:
k if q;
i; = k and ai; 2 fu; q;i;g
0 if q;
i;
= 0 and ai; 2 fd; q;i;g
ai; otherwise.
Set h = (;; ai;) and dene
Nhu =
(
fi;g if ai; = u
; otherwise, N
h
d =
(
fi;g if ai; = d
; otherwise,
Nhs =
(
fi;g if ai; 2 fq;i; ; : : : ; q;i;g
; otherwise, and N
h = Nhu [Nhd [Nhs :
17The set of available actions A;
i; (when i
; plays for the rst time) can be seen as a partition of R by
identifying action u as the subset fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) > q;i;g, action d as the subset fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) < q;i;g
and each action ai; 2 fq;i; ; : : : ; q;i;g as the subset fRi; 2 R j (Ri;) = ai;g. Observe that when either
q;
i; = k or q
;
i;
= 0 the rst or the second set is empty.
16
Notice that ai; 2 f0; kg implies i; 2 Nhs , i 2 Nhu implies q;i < k and i 2 Nhd implies 0 < q;i; :
Dene two vectors mh;mh 2 f0; : : : ; kgn as follows. For each j 2 N ,
mhj =
8><>:
0 if j 2 Nhd [ (NnNh)
q;
i; if j 2 Nhu and j = i;
ai; if j 2 Nhs and j = i;
and18
mhj =
8><>:
k if j 2 Nhu [ (NnNh)
q;
i;
if j 2 Nhd and j = i;
ai; if j 2 Nhs and j = i;:
Dene
(mh) = qh and (mh) = qh: (6)
Let h be the output of Step A.0 and collect (qh; qh) and Nh; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s as output
information.
If qh = qh set qh = qh = qh. Go to Stage B with input h and collect qh and Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s
as input information.
If qh 6= qh set h0 := h as the output of Step A.0. Go to Step A.1 with input h0 and
collect (qh
0
; qh
0
) and Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s as input information.
Step A.t (t 1):
Input of Step A.t: h0, output of Step A.t-1.
Input information of Step A.t: (qh0 ; qh0) and Nh0 ; Nh0u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s (with N
h0 6= N).
Dene ih
0
= min<fi 2 NnNh0s j qh0i < qh
0
i g.19
Agent ih
0
has to choose an action from the set
Ah
0
ih
0 =
8><>:
fd; qh0
ih
0 ; : : : ; qh
0
ih
0 ; ug if ih0 =2 Nh0
fqh0
ih
0 + 1; : : : ; qh
0
ih0 ; ug if ih
0 2 Nh0u
fd; qh0
ih0
; : : : ; qh
0
ih0   1g if ih
0 2 Nh0d :
Let aih0 2 Ah0ih0 be the choice of ih
0
and, as we have done previously, dene
aih0 =
8><>:
k if qh
0
ih0 = k and aih0 2 fu; qh
0
ih0g
0 if qh
0
ih0
= 0 and aih0 2 fd; qh0ih0g
aih0 otherwise.
Set h = (h0; aih0 ) and dene
Nhu =
(
Nh
0
u [ fih0g if aih0 = u
Nh
0
u otherwise,
Nhd =
(
Nh
0
d [ fih0g if aih0 = d
Nh
0
d otherwise,
18In this case (Step A.0), the condition j = i; is redundant if j 2 Nhd [Nhs [Nhu :We adopt this notation
in order to be consistent with the next steps and help the reader to better understand the denitions of mh
and mh for a generic Step A.t, with t 1:
19The proof of Theorem 2 shows that agent ih
0
is well dened.
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Nhs =
(
Nh
0
s [ fih0g if aih0 2 fqh0ih0 ; : : : ; qh
0
ih
0g
Nh
0
s otherwise
and Nh = Nhu [Nhd [Nhs :
Notice that aih0 2 f0; kg implies ih0 2 Nhs , i 2 Nhu implies qh
0
i < k and i 2 Nhd implies
0 < qh
0
i
:
Dene two vectors mh;mh 2 f0; : : : ; kgn as follows. For each j 2 N ,
mhj =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if j 2 Nhd [ (NnNh)
qh
0
j if j 2 Nhu and j = ih0
qh
0
j
if j 2 Nhu [Nhs and j 6= ih0
aih0 if j 2 Nhs and j = ih0
and
mhj =
8>>>><>>>>:
k if j 2 Nhu [ (NnNh)
qh
0
j
if j 2 Nhd and j = ih0
qh
0
j if j 2 Nhd [Nhs and j 6= ih0
aih0 if j 2 Nhs and j = ih0 :
Dene
(mh) = qh and (mh) = qh: (7)
Let h be the output of Step A.t and collect (qh; qh) and Nh; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s as output
information.
If qh 6= qh set h0 := h. Go to Step A.t+1 with input h0 and collect (qh0 ; qh0) and
Nh
0
; Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s as input information.
Proceed until Step A.t0, with output h, where qh = qh holds and set qh = qh = qh. Then,
h is the output of Stage A. Go to Stage B with input h and collect qh and Nh; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s
as input information.
Stage B follows steps of Stage 1 and Stage 2 (if needed) in the specic phase of the
algorithm as follows. If Nh 6= N; go to Step 1.t, where t= Nh, with input h and input
information qh and Nh; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s (respectively, output and output information of Step
A.t-1).20 If Nh = N and one of the two sets Nhu or N
h
d is empty, the history h is terminal
and the allotment qh is the outcome associated to h (i.e., set o(h) = i). If Nh = N and
Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;, set h00 := h and go to Step 2.1.a with input h00 and input information
qh
00
and Nh
00
; Nh
00
u ; N
h00
d ; N
h00
s (respectively, output and output information of Step A.t
0, the
last of Stage A).
End of the General Phase of the Algorithm.
Let  be a sequential allotment rule. We denote by   = (N; k; (H;) ;N ;A; o) the
extensive game form dened by the general phase of the algorithm, where ((H;) ;N ;A; o)
are dened accordingly in an obvious way.
20The reason of going to Stage 1 is to sort out the agents that have not played in Stage A into the
three subsets of agents (those that would like to go up, down or stay).
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Remark 1 Let h be the input of Stage B and qh andNhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s be its input information.
Consider the subdomain of proles
Dh = Dh1      Dhn  Rn;
where, for each i 2 N;
Dhi =
8>>><>>>:
fRi 2 R j (Ri) 2 fqhi ; : : : ; kgg if i 2 Nhu
fRi 2 R j (Ri) 2 f0; : : : ; qhi gg if i 2 Nhd
fRi 2 R j (Ri) = qhi g if i 2 Nhs
R if i =2 Nh;
and denote by h : Dh ! X the restriction of  : Rn ! X to Dh. Since  is tops-only, h
is also tops-only and so, abusing with the notation, we can write it as h : Dh ! X where
Dh =
 
[qhi ; k]

i2Nhu 
 
[0; qhi ]

i2Nhd
 fqhi gi2Nhs  ([0; k])i=2Nh :
Moreover, since  is strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic, h is strategy-
proof, e¢ cient, replacement monotonic, and21
h

kNhu[(NnNh); q
h
Nhd [Nhs

= h

0Nhd [(NnNh); q
h
Nhu[Nhs

= qh: (8)
Let  
h
be the extensive game form dened by Stage B of the generic phase of the algorithm
with input h, applied to the rule h : Dh ! X. Theorem 1 implies that  h OSP-implements
h. 
Let Ri 2 R be arbitrary and let  i = (Ri):We dene is truth-telling strategy Rii 2 i
relative to Ri in   by looking at each history h at which i plays at h; that is, i = ih (i.e.,
N (h) = i).
Let h be a history in Stage A, and let (qh
i
; qhi ) is an input information of the Step A.t,
for which h is an input.
If h is a history in Stage A and i =2 Nh; then Ahi = fd; qhi ; : : : ; qhi ; ug and
Rii (h) =
8><>:
u if  i > qhi
 i if  i 2 fqhi ; : : : ; qhi g
d if  i < qhi :
If h is a history in Stage A and i 2 Nhu ; then Ahi = fqhi + 1; : : : ; qhi ; ug and
Rii (h) =
(
u if  i > qhi
 i if  i 2 fqhi + 1; : : : ; qhi g:
21The fact that h is the outcome of Stage A implies that (mh) = (mh) = qh. Then, the denitions
of mh and mh and Lemmata 3 and 6 (stated and proved in Appendix 2 in Subsection 6.2) imply that the
equality in (8) holds.
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If h is a history in Stage A and i 2 Nhd ; then Ahi = fd; qhi ; : : : ; qhi   1g and
Rii (h) =
(
d if  i < qhi
 i if  i 2 fqhi ; : : : ; qhi   1g:
If h is a history in Stage B the denition of Rii is as in (3), (4) and (5) at the end of
the specic phase of the algorithm described in the previous Subsection 4.1.1.
Now we can state our general and main result.
Theorem 2 Let  be a sequential allotment rule. Then, the extensive game form  
OSP-implements .
Proof See Subsection 6.2 in Appendix 1.
The main di¢ culty of the proof of Theorem 2 is to show that, if the rule  is not
individually rational, the process of transforming the two reference allotments q = (0) and
q = (k) into a unique reference allotment q in Stage A is well dened and it has the right
properties. In particular, the monotonicity property of the sequence of each is reference
allotments depends on the subset of agents to which i is classied throughout Stage A (see
the statements and proofs of Lemmata 3 to 8). Then, once the algorithm enters Stage B,
adapted arguments to those already used in the proof of Theorem 1 can be used. They are
presented in the proofs of Statements 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
4.3 Outline of the Algorithm
In this subsection we give an outline of the algorithm.
Input : A sequential allotment rule  : Rn ! X:
If (0) = q 6= q = (k), go to Stage A.
Stage A:
Step A.t: (t 0)
Input: h0, output of Step A.t-1 if t 1 or h0 = ; if t= 0.
Input information: (qh
0
; qh
0
) and Nh
0
; Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s , with N
h0 6= N and Nh0 =
Nh
0
u = N
h0
d = N
h0
s = ; if t= 0.
Dene ih
0
, aih0 , h = (h
0; aih0 ), N
h; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s and m
h;mh:
Set qh = (mh) and qh = (mh):
If qh 6= qh set h0 := h and go to Stage A.t+1 with input h0:
If qh = qh set qh = qh = qh and go to Stage B.
Stage B:
Input: h, output of Step A.t.
Input information: qh and Nh; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s .
If Nh 6= N go to Step 1.t of Stage 1 with
20
t=
Nh
input: h0
input information: qh
0
and Nh
0
; Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s , with N
h0 6= N .
If Nh = N and Nhu = ; or Nhd = ; stop with o(h) = qh.
If Nh = N and Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ; set h00 := h and go to Step 2.1.a in
Stage 2, with
input: h00
input information: qh
00
and Nh
00
u ; N
h00
d ; N
h00
s .
If (0) = (k) = q, go to Stage 1.
Stage 1:
Step 1.t: (t 0)
Input: h0, output of Step 1.t-1 or Stage B if t 1 or h0 = ; if t= 0.
Input information: qh
0
= q and Nh
0
; Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s , with N
h0 6= N , and Nh0 =
Nh
0
u = N
h0
d = N
h0
s = ; if t= 0.
Dene ih
0
, aih0 , h = (h
0; aih0 ); N
h; Nhu ; N
h
d ; N
h
s and q
h = qh
0
.
If Nh 6= N , set h0 := h and go to Step 1.t+1 with input h0.
If Nh = N and Nhu = ; or Nhd = ;, stop with o(h) = qh.
If Nh = N and Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;, set h00 := h and go to Step 2.1.a
in Stage 2 with input h00.
Stage 2:
Step 2.t.a: (t 1)
Input: h00, output of Stage 1 or Stage A.
Input information: qh
00
and Nh
00
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h00
s with N
h00
u 6= ; and Nh00d 6= ;.
Dene ih
00
, aih00 , h
0 = (h00; aih00 ); N
h0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s and q
h0 = qh
00
.
Go to Step 2.t.b with input h0.
Step 2.t.b: (t 1)
Input: h0, output of Step 2.t.a.
Input information: qh
0
, ih
00
and Nh
0
u ; N
h0
d ; N
h0
s with N
h0
d 6= ;.
Dene ih
0
, aih0 , h = (h
0; aih0 ); N
h
u ; N
h
d ; N
h
s and q
h.
If Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;, set h00 := h and go to Step 2.t+1.a with
input h00.
If Nh = ; or Nhd = ;, stop with o(h) = qh.
4.4 Example
In this subsection we illustrate the algorithm dened in the previous subsections with one
example.
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Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and k = 12: Consider the sequential allotment rule  such that
(0; 0; 0; 0) = (4; 4; 4; 0) = q 6= q = (0; 0; 0; 12) = (12; 12; 12; 12): (9)
Moreover, suppose that  is such that
(12; 12; 12; 2) = (0; 0; 0; 2) = (3; 3; 4; 2);
(12; 2; 12; 2) = (4; 2; 4; 2);
(4; 0; 4; 2) = (5; 1; 4; 2);
(4; 1; 12; 2) = (4; 0; 5; 2) = (4; 1; 5; 2);
and
(4; 0; 12; 2) = (4; 0; 6; 2) = (4; 0; 6; 2):
Observe that those values (that will be used in what follows) are consistent with the existence
of a rule obtained by means of Denition 3 (in Appendix 2, Section 7) and satisfying strategy-
proofness, e¢ ciency and replacement monotonicity.
We apply the general phase of the algorithm to the rule : Since (9) holds,  is not
individually rational with respect to any allotment. Go to Stage A.
Step A.0: The input history is h = ; and the input information is q; = (4; 4; 4; 0), q; =
(0; 0; 0; 12) and N; = N;u = N
;
d = N
;
s = ;: Since 4 is the unique agent in fi 2 N j q;i < q;i g,
set i; = 4 and A;4 = fd; 0; : : : ; 12; ug: Assume agent 4 chooses a4 = 2 (this would happen if
 4 = 2), and so a4 = 2. Set h = (;; a4 = 2) and dene Nhu = Nhd = f;g and Nh = Nhs = f4g:
Then,
mh = (0; 0; 0; 2) and mh = (12; 12; 12; 2);
and we assumed that the sequential allotment rule is such that(mh) = (mh) = (3; 3; 4; 2) =
qh = qh: Set qh = (3; 3; 4; 2). Go to Stage B at Step 1.1 of Stage 1 with input
h0 := h = (;; a4 = 2).
Step 1.1: The input history is h0 = (;; a4 = 2) and the input information is qh0 = (3; 3; 4; 2),
Nh
0
u = N
h0
d = f;g and Nh0 = Nh0s = f4g: Since 1 is the agent with the smallest index in
fi 2 N j i =2 Nh0g; set ih0 = 1 and Ah01 = fd; 3; ug: Assume agent 1 chooses a1 = u (this
would happen if  1 > 3), and so a1 = u. Set h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u) and dene Nhu = f1g;
Nhd = f;g; Nhs = f4g and Nh = f1; 4g: Set qh = (3; 3; 4; 2) and since Nh 6= N go to Step
1.2 with input h0 := h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u):
Step 1.2: The input history is h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u) and the input information is qh0 =
(3; 3; 4; 2), Nh
0
u = f1g; Nh0d = f;g; Nh0s = f4g and Nh0 = f1; 4g. Since 2 is the agent with the
smallest index in fi 2 N j i =2 Nh0g; set ih0 = 2 and Ah02 = fd; 3; ug: Assume agent 2 chooses
a2 = d (this would happen if  2 < 3), and so a2 = d. Set h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d) and
dene Nhu = f1g; Nhd = f2g; Nhs = f4g and Nh = f1; 2; 4g. Set qh = (3; 3; 4; 2) and since
Nh 6= N go to Step 1.3 with input h0 := h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d).
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Step 1.3: The input history is h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d) and the input information is
qh
0
= (3; 3; 4; 2), Nh
0
u = f1g; Nh0d = f2g; Nh0s = f4g and Nh0 = f1; 2; 4g. Since 3 is the unique
agent in fi 2 N j i =2 Nh0g; set ih0 = 3 and Ah03 = fd; 4; ug: Assume agent 3 chooses a3 = u
(this would happen if  3 > 4), and so a3 = u. Set h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u)
and dene Nhu = f1; 3g; Nhd = f2g; Nhs = f4g; and Nh = f1; 2; 3; 4g. Set qh = (3; 3; 4; 2)
and since Nh = N , Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;, go to Stage 2 at Step 2.1.a with input
h00 := h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u).
Step 2.1.a: The input history is h00 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u) and the input
information is qh
00
= (3; 3; 4; 2), Nh
00
u = f1; 3g; Nh00d = f2g; and Nh00s = f4g: Observe that,
since qh
00
2   1 = 2, the prole of tops (kNh00u ; (qh
00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
), used to identify ih
00
, is
equal to the vector (12; 2; 12; 2): We assumed that the sequential allotment rule  is such
that (12; 2; 12; 2) = (4; 2; 4; 2): Since agent 1 is the unique agent in the set fj 2 Nh00u j
j(12; 2; 12; 2)  qh00j +1g, set ih00 = 1 and Ah001 = f4; ug: Assume agent 1 chooses a1 = 4 (this
would happen if  1 = 4), and so a1 = 4. Set h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u; a1 = 4)
and dene Nh
0
u = f3g; Nh0d = f2g and Nh0s = f1; 4g: Set qh0 = (3; 3; 4; 2) and go to Step
2.1.b with input h0.
Step 2.1.b: The input history is h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u; a1 = 4) and the
input information is qh
0
= (3; 3; 4; 2), ih
00
= 1; Nh
0
u = f3g; Nh0d = f2g; and Nh0s = f1; 4g:
Observe that, since qh
0
ih
00 + 1 = 4, the prole of tops (qh
0
ih
00 + 1;0Nh0d
; qh
0
 Nh0d [fih00g
), used to
identify ih
0
, is equal to the vector (4; 0; 4; 2): We assumed that the sequential allotment
rule  is such that (4; 0; 4; 2) = (5; 1; 4; 2): Since agent 2 is the unique agent in the set
fj 2 Nh0d j j(4; 0; 4; 2)  qh0j   1g, set ih0 = 2 and Ah02 = fd; 2g: Assume agent 2 chooses
a2 = d (this would happen if  2 < 2), and so a2 = d. Set h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 =
u; a1 = 4; a2 = d) and dene Nhu = f3g; Nhd = f2g; Nhs = f1; 4g and qh = (4; 2; 4; 2): Since
Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ; go to Step 2.2.a with input h00 := h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 =
u; a1 = 4; a2 = d).
Step 2.2.a: The input history is h00 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u; a1 = 4; a2 = d)
and the input information is qh
00
= (4; 2; 4; 2), Nh
00
u = f3g; Nh00d = f2g and Nh00s = f1; 4g:
Observe that, since qh
00
2   1 = 1, the prole of tops (kNh00u ; (qh
00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
); used to
identify ih
00
, is equal to the vector (4; 1; 12; 2): We assumed that the sequential allotment
rule is such that (4; 1; 12; 2) = (4; 1; 5; 2): Since agent 3 is the unique agent in the set
fj 2 Nh00u j j(4; 1; 12; 2)  qh00j + 1g, set ih00 = 3 and Ah003 = f5; ug. Assume agent 3 chooses
a3 = u (this would happen if  3 > 5), and so a3 = u. Set h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 =
d; a3 = u; a1 = 4; a2 = d; a3 = u) and dene Nh
0
u = f3g; Nh0d = f2g and Nh0s = f1; 4g: Set
qh
0
= (4; 2; 4; 2) and go to Step 2.2.b with input h0.
Step 2.2.b: The input history is h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u; a1 = 4; a2 = d; a3 =
u) and the input information is qh
0
= (4; 2; 4; 2), ih
00
= 3; Nh
0
u = f3g; Nh0d = f2g; and Nh0s =
f1; 4g: Observe that, since qh0
ih00 + 1 = 5, the prole of tops (q
h0
ih00 + 1;0Nh0d
; qh
0
 Nh0d [fih00g
), used
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to identify ih
0
, is equal to the vector (4; 0; 5; 2): We assumed that the sequential allotment
rule  is such that (4; 0; 5; 2) = (4; 1; 5; 2): Since agent 2 is the unique agent in the set
fj 2 Nh0d j j(4; 0; 5; 2)  qh0j   1g, set ih0 = 2 and Ah02 = fd; 1g: Assume agent 2 chooses
a2 = 1 (this would happen if  2 = 1), and so a2 = 1. Set h = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 =
d; a3 = u; a1 = 4; a2 = d; a3 = u; a2 = 1) and dene Nhu = f3g; Nhd = ; and Nhs = f1; 2; 4g
and qh = (4; 1; 5; 2): Since Nhd = ; the history h is terminal and the allotment o(h) = qh =
(4; 1; 5; 2) is the outcome associated to h; and the outcome of the algorithm. Observe that
( 1;  2;  3;  4) = (4; 1; 5; 2) for any prole of top allotments ( 1;  2;  3;  4) such that  1 = 4;
 2 = 1;  3  6 and  4 = 2; which are those consistent with the truth-telling choices made
by agents along the play of the game.
5 Final Remarks
We nish the paper with three remarks.
First, our implementation result requires that the rule  satises replacement monotonic-
ity. Example 1 below contains an instance of a discrete division problem where there is a
tops-only, strategy-proof, e¢ cient and non replacement monotonic rule that is not obviously
strategy-proof.
Example 1 Consider the discrete division problem where N = f1; 2; 3g and k = 2: Let
	 : R3 ! X be the tops-only rule such that, for every  = ( 1;  2;  3) 2 f0; 1; 2g3; the top of
agent 1 determines the ordering between agents 2 and 3 to successively select the allotment
they wish, if available, and agent 1s allotment is equal to the remainder, if any. Namely,
	( 1;  2;  3) =
(
(2   2  minf2   2;  3g;  2;minf2   2;  3g) if  1 2 f0; 1g
(2   3  minf2   3;  2g;minf2   3;  2g;  3) if  1 = 2:
It is easy to check that 	 is strategy-proof and e¢ cient. To see that it is not replacement
monotonic, consider  = ( 1;  2;  3) = (0; 1; 2) and  0 = ( 01;  2;  3) = (2; 1; 2): Then, 	() =
(0; 1; 1) and 	( 0) = (0; 0; 2): Since 	1() = 	1( 0), 	2() > 	2( 0) and 	3() < 	3( 0); 	
is not replacement monotonic.
To obtain a contradiction, assume that 	 is obviously strategy-proof on R3, and let
  be the game that OSP-implements 	: Given a prole of tops  ; let  = (11 ; : : : ; 
n
n )
be the truth-telling strategy prole (namely, for each i 2 N and Ri 2 R,  ii = Rii
where  i = (Ri)). Since   induces 	; there must exists h 2 HNT such that h is one of
the shortest histories with the property that agent N (h) = i has available at least two
di¤erent actions. Denote those actions by a1; a2 2 A(h). Assume rst that N (h) = 1
and consider the two proles of tops  = (1; 0; 0) and  0 = (2; 1; 0): Then, since   induces
	, o1(h (h;  )) = 2 = 	1() and o1(h (h; 
0
)) = 1 = 	1(
0). Consider 2 and 3 with
the following properties: (i) they coincide respectively with 22 and 
3
3 at all histories
that follow (h; a1), (ii) they coincide respectively with 
0
2
2 and 
 03
3 at all histories that
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follow (h; a2) and (iii) h  h (;; (11 ; 2; 3)) and h  h (;; (
0
1
1 ; 2; 3)). Note that such
strategies do exist since h was selected to be one of the shortest histories with a1; a2 2 A(h).
Since (P1) = 1 and
o1(h
 (;; ( 011 ; 2; 3))) = 1P12 = o1(h (;; (11 ; 2; 3)));
the strategy 11 is not weakly dominant in  , a contradiction with the assumption that
  OSP-implements 	. Assume now that N (h) = 2 and consider the two proles of tops
 = (2; 1; 2) and  0 = (1; 1; 2): Then, since   induces 	, o2(h (h;  )) = 0 = 	2() and
o2(h
 (h; 
0
)) = 1 = 	2(
0). Consider 1 and 3 with the following properties: (i) they
coincide respectively with 11 and 
3
3 at all histories that follow (h; a
1), (ii) they coincide re-
spectively with 
0
1
1 and 
 03
3 at all histories that follow (h; a
2) and (iii) h  h (;; (1; 22 ; 3))
and h  h (;; (1; 
0
2
2 ; 3)): Note that such strategies do exist since h was selected to be
one of the shortest histories with a1; a2 2 A(h). Since (P2) = 1 and
o2(h
 (;; (1; 
0
2
2 ; 3))) = 1P20 = o1(h
 (;; (1; 22 ; 3)));
the strategy 22 is not weakly dominant in  , a contradiction with the assumption that
  OSP-implements 	. A similar argument can be used to obtain a contradiction when
N (h) = 3: 
Second, Pycia and Troyan (2018) proposes a strengthening of obvious strategy-proofness
called strong obvious strategy-proofness. The key di¤erence with Li (2017)s notion is
that, when comparing the possible outcomes of the truth-telling strategy with the possible
outcomes of any deviation at an earliest point of departure, the truth-telling strategy may
change along the subsequent play of the game, instead of being xed as in Li (2017). It is
easy to see that not all sequential allotment rules satisfy this stronger requirement. However,
the subclass of sequential dictators do (and they can be described as sequential allotment
rules), since agents play only once along the game. We conjecture that, at the light of
Theorem 4 in Pycia and Troyan (2018), the class of all e¢ cient, restricted monotonic and
strong obviously strategy-proof rules coincides with class of all sequential dictator rules.
Third, our extensive game form is based on the discrete version of Sprumont (1991)s
continuous model. An OSP-implementation of any sequential allotment rule in the con-
tinuous version of the model should deal with the technical di¢ culties that may arise in
extensive game forms where agents play in a continuous fashion (see for instance Alós-
Ferrer and Ritzberger (2013)). For simplicity, we have decided to undertake our analysis in
the discrete version of the model, rst studied by Herrero and Martínez (2011).
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6 Appendix 1: Proofs
We will intensively use the following notation. Given   2 G, h 2 H and i 2 N we will
denote by bh the history at which i has played for the last time before h; namely, bh is such
that (i) bh  h; (ii) ibh = i and (iii) there is no eh 6= bh such that bh  eh  h and ieh = ibh. Of
course, bh depends on i but since i will be clear from the context, we will omit its reference
when denoting this earlier history.
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6.1 Theorem 1
Let  be a sequential allotment rule satisfying individually rational with respect to q 2 X
and let   be the extensive game form obtained from the specic phase of the algorithm
dened in Subsection 4.1.1.
We rst present preliminary results that we will use in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let h = (h00; aih00 ; aih0 ) be the output of Step 2.t.b (for t1), with h0 =
(h00; aih00 ), and let q
h and Nhu , N
h
d , N
h
s be its output information. Then,
(1.1) (0Nhd ; q
h
NnNhd
) = qh and
(1.2) if Nhu 6= ;; then
j(kNhu ; (q
h00   1)Nhd ; q
h
Nhs
) =
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 Nhd
qhj if j 2 Nhs :
Proof of Lemma 1
(1.1) If Nhd = ;, the statement follows from e¢ ciency of  and feasibility of qh: Consider
now the case Nhd 6= ;: We proceed by induction on t.
Suppose t= 1: Hence, h00 is the output of Stage 1, Nh00 = N and qh00 = q. By strategy-
proofness and e¢ ciency of  and (0) = qh
00
,
(0Nh00d
; qh
00
Nh
00
u
; qh
00
Nh
00
s
) = qh
00
: (10)
Then,
i(0Nh00d
; qh
00
Nh00u nfih00g; q
h00
ih00 + 1; q
h00
Nh00s
) 
8><>:
qh
00
i + 1 if i = i
h00
qh
00
i   1 if i = ih0
qh
00
i if i 2 Nnfih00 ; ih0g:
(11)
The inequality in the rst raw of (11) follows from strategy-proofness, single-peakedness,
(10) and the fact that ih
00 2 Nh00u . The inequality in the second raw follows from the denition
of ih
0
and qh
0
= qh
00
. The inequality in the third raw follows from replacement monotonicity
and (10). Since qh
00
is a feasible allotment, the inequality in (11) can be replaced by an
equality, and since
qhi =
8><>:
qh
00
i + 1 if i = i
h00
qh
00
i   1 if ih00 = ih0
qh
00
i if i 2 Nnfih00 ; ih0g
and ih
0 2 Nh00d , we obtain
(0Nh00d
; qh
NnNh00d
) = qh: (12)
To prove that the statement in (1.1) holds, we proceed by distinguishing between two cases,
depending on the action aih0 2 Ah0ih0 = fd; qh
0
ih0   1g:
Case 1: Suppose aih0 = d: Then, N
h
d = N
h00
d and, by (12),
(0Nhd ; q
h
NnNhd ) = q
h:
27
Case 2: Suppose aih0 = q
h0
ih0   1: Then, Nhd = Nh
0
d nfih0g = Nh00d nfih0g; where the second
equality follows from Nh
0
d = N
h00
d : Hence, by (12), strategy-proofness of  implies
ih0 (0Nhd ; q
h
NnNhd ) = q
h
ih0 : (13)
Then, by (12), (13) and replacement monotonicity,
(0Nhd ; q
h
NnNhd ) = q
h:
This nishes the proof of (1.1) for the case t= 1:
Induction hypothesis: for t> 1; if h00 = (h0000; aih0000 ; aih000 ) is the input of Step 2.t-1.a,
then
(0Nh00d
; qh
00
NnNh00d
) = qh
00
: (14)
Observe that in the proof of (1.1) for the case t= 1, (10) can be replaced by (14) and
using the same argument, it follows that
(0Nhd ; q
h
NnNhd ) = q
h:
(1.2) Assume Nhu 6= ;: By condition (1) in the characterization of e¢ cient rules,
j(kNhu ; (q
h00   1)Nhd ; q
h
Nhs
) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 Nhd
qhj if j 2 Nhs :
(15)
In order to show that the other inequality holds as well, we proceed by induction on t.
Suppose t= 1: Hence, h00 is the output of Stage 1 and Nh00 = N , Nh00u 6= ;, Nh00d 6= ;;
and qh
00
= q. By strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency of  and (k) = qh
00
,
(kNh00u ; q
h00
Nh
00
d
; qh
00
Nh
00
s
) = qh
00
: (16)
Let i1 2 Nh00d : By strategy-proofness (for i1), single-peakedness, replacement monotonicity
and (16),
j(kNh00u ; q
h00
Nh
00
d nfi1g
; qh
00
i1
  1; qh00
Nh
00
s
) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j = i1
qh
00
j if j 2 Nh00s [ (Nh00d nfi1g):
(17)
Let i2 2 Nh00d nfi1g; if any. By strategy-proofness (for i2), single-peakedness, replacement
monotonicity and (17),
j(kNh00u ; q
h00
Nh
00
d nfi1;i2g
; (qh
00   1)fi1;i2g; qh
00
Nh00s
) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 fi1; i2g
qh
00
j if j 2 Nh00s [ (Nh00d nfi1; i2g)):
If we continue in the same way, we obtain that Nh
00
d nfi1; : : : ; iTg = ; for a T  1, and
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh00s
) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 Nh00d
qh
00
j if j 2 Nh00s :
(18)
28
Furthermore, by denition of ih
00
;
ih00 (kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh00s
)  qh00
ih00 + 1: (19)
From (18) and (19), and since qhj = q
h00
j for all j 2 Nh00s , qh00ih00 + 1 = qhih00 , qh
00
ih0   1 = qhih0 and
ih
0 2 Nh00d ;
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h
Nh
00
s
) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 Nh00d
qhj if j 2 Nh00s [ fih00 ; ih0g:
(20)
Since Nh
00
d = N
h
d or N
h
d = N
h00
d nfih0g with ih0 2 Nhs and qh00ih0   1 = qhih0 and Nh
00
s  Nhs 
Nh
00
s [ fih00 ; ih0g;
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nhd ; q
h
Nhs nfih00g) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 Nhd
qhj if j 2 Nhs [ fih00g:
(21)
Since Nh
00
u = N
h
u and N
h
s nfih00g = Nhs or Nhu = Nh00u nfih00g with ih00 2 Nhs and qhih00  k; by
strategy-proofness (for ih
00
) and replacement monotonicity,
j(kNhu ; (q
h00   1)Nhd ; q
h
Nhs
) 
(
qh
00   1 if j 2 Nhd
qhj if j 2 Nhs :
(22)
This, together with (15), nishes the proof of (1.2) for the case t= 1:
Induction hypothesis: for t> 1; if h00 = (h0000; aih0000 ; aih000 ) is the input of the Step 2.t-1.a,
then
j(kNh00u ; (q
h0000   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
) =
(
qh
0000
j   1 if j 2 Nh00d
qh
00
j if j 2 Nh00s :
(23)
We now show that (23) holds as well when h0000 is replaced by h00 and h00 by h. We rst prove
that (23) implies (18). Then, to obtain (22), the proof follows the same argument used in
the case t= 1.
If ih
000
=2 Nh00d ; then qh0000j = qh00j for all j 2 Nh00d : Therefore (23) implies (18) and the proof
follows as in the case t= 1:
If ih
000 2 Nh00d ; then qh0000j   1 = qh00j   1 if j 2 Nh00d nfih000g and qh0000j   1 = qh00j if j = ih000 .
Then, by strategy-proofness (for ih
000
) and (23),
ih000 (kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
)  qh00
ih
000   1; (24)
which is (18) for j = ih
000
: Now, since qh
0000
ih000   1  qh
00
ih000   1, by replacement monotonicity and
(23),
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh00s
) 
(
qh
00
j   1 if j 2 Nh00d nfih000g
qh
00
j if j 2 Nh00s :
(25)
Therefore, (24) and (25) imply (18) and the proof of (1.2) follows as in the case t= 1: 
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Lemma 2 Let h 2 HT be a terminal history (and hence, Nhu = ; or Nhd = ;). Then,
(2.1) if Nhu = ;; (0Nhd ; qhNhs ) = qh and
(2.2) if Nhu 6= ;; (kNhu ; qhNhs ) = qh:
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose h is the output of Stage 1. Then, qh = q = (0) = (k)
and, by strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity,
(kNhu ; q
h
NnNhu ) = (0Nhd ; q
h
NnNhd ) = q
h: (26)
Then, (2.1) and (2.2) follow from (26).
Now suppose that h = (h00; aih00 ; aih0 ) is the output of Step 2.t.b. Then, (2.1) follows
from (1.1) in Lemma 1. To show that (2.2) holds, assume Nhu 6= ;; and so Nhd = ;: We now
show that
(kNhu ; q
h
Nhs
) = qh:
By (1.2) in Lemma 1 and the fact that Nhd = ;; for all j 2 Nhs ,
j(kNhu ; q
h
Nhs
) = qhj : (27)
Let j 2 Nhu . We show that
j(kNhu ; q
h
Nhs
)  qhj
holds by distinguishing between two cases.
Case 1: Suppose j has not played along Stage 2. Then, by replacement monotonicity and
the denition of qhj ,
j(kNhu ; q
h
Nhs
)  qhj = qj = j (k) :
Case 2: Suppose j has played along Stage 2. Since j 2 Nhu ; there exists eh = (eh00; aieh00 ; aieh0 ) 
h; the output of Step 2.t.b for some t  1; such that j = ieh00 ; and eh00 is the last history at
which j has played along Stage 2. By denition of ieh00 and qhj ,
j(kNeh00u ; (q
eh00   1)
N
eh00
d
; q
eh00
N
eh00
s
)  qeh00j + 1 = qhj : (28)
If i 2 Neh00s ; then i 2 Nhs and by the denition of qhi ,
qhi = q
eh00
i :
If i 2 Neh00d ; and since Nhd = ; implies i 2 Nhs ; we have that i is called to play at least once
at some history h0 such that eh00  h0  h (and so, ih0 = i): Then, by denition of qhi and the
fact that i 2 Neh00d ;
qhi  qhi  qeh00i   1:
By replacement monotonicity and the fact that j 2 Nhu  N ~h00u ;
j(kNeh00u ; (q
eh00   1)
N
eh00
d
; q
eh00
N
eh00
s
)  j(kNhu ; qhNhs ): (29)
30
Thus, (28) and (29) imply that
qhj  j(kNhu ; qhNhs ): (30)
By (27), (30) and feasibility of qh;
(kNhu ; q
h
Nhs
) = qh:
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2. 
Proof of Theorem 1 It follows from the three statements that we will present and prove
successively.
Statement 1.1 Let  be an individually rational sequential allotment rule. Then, the
extensive game form   is well dened and nite.
Proof of Statement 1.1 We rst argue that the agents that are called to play along the
specic phase of the algorithm are uniquely identied and well dened. This is clear in any
Step 1.t for t 1.
Consider now Step 2.t.a and Step 2.t.b, for t 1; with corresponding inputs h00 and
h0, where h00 is not a terminal history. Since i 2 Nh00d implies 0 < qh00i ;
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
) (31)
is well dened for all j 2 N . Moreover, the sum of the components of the vector where j
is applied in (31) is larger or equal than k. Hence, by e¢ ciency,P
j =2Nh00u
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
)  P
j2Nh00s
qh
00
j +
P
j2Nh00d
(qh
00
j   1) <
P
j =2Nh00u
qh
00
j :
By feasibility of qh
00
; P
j2Nh00u
j(kNh00u ; (q
h00   1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh00s
) >
P
j2Nh00u
qh
00
j :
Hence, min<fj 2 Nh00u j j(kNh00u ; (qh
00  1)Nh00d ; q
h00
Nh
00
s
)  qh00j +1g is well dened and so is ih00.
Similarly, and since i 2 Nh00u implies qh00i < k;
j(q
h0
ih00 + 1;0Nh0d
; qh
0
 Nh0d [fih00g
) (32)
is well dened for all j 2 N . Moreover, the sum of the components of the vector where j
is applied in (32) is smaller or equal than k. Hence, by e¢ ciency,P
j =2Nh0d
j(q
h0
ih
00 + 1;0Nh0d
; qh
0
 Nh0d [fih00g
)  P
j2Nn(Nh0d [fih00g)
qh
0
j + q
h0
ih00 + 1 >
P
j =2Nh0d
qh
0
j :
By feasibility of qh
0
; P
j2Nh0d
j(q
h0
ih
00 + 1;0Nh0d
; qh
0
 Nh0d [fih00g
) <
P
j2Nh0d
qh
0
j :
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Hence, min<fj 2 Nh0d j j(qh0ih00 + 1;0Nh0d ; q
h0
 Nh0d [fih00g
)  qh0j   1g is well dened and so is ih0.
Second, the sets of agents dened along the specic phase of the algorithm are well
dened because they evolve, for any h  h0, as follows.
(a) If i 2 Nh0u for some h0, then i =2 Nhd and i 2 Nhu [Nhs :
(b) If i 2 Nh0d for some h0, then i =2 Nhu and i 2 Nhd [Nhs :
(c) If i 2 Nh0s for some h0, then i 2 Nhs :
(d) If Nh
0
u ; N
h0
s ; N
h0
d is a partition of N , then N
h
u ; N
h
s ; N
h
d is also a partition of N:
To see that the statements (a) to (d) hold, let h  h0 be arbitrary. Assume i 2 Nh0u .
If i is not called to play anymore, i 2 Nhu : Suppose i is called to play at h (i.e., ih = i).
Then, d =2 Ahi . Hence, either i 2 Nhu or i 2 Nhs : Thus, (a) holds. Symmetrically if i 2 Nh0d :
Suppose now that i 2 Nh0s : Then i will not be called to play anymore. Hence, Nhs  Nh0s
which implies that i 2 Nhs : Thus, (c) holds. The proof of (d) follows immediately from the
denitions of Nhu ; N
h
s and N
h
d :
Now, we argue that the extensive game form dened by the algorithm is nite.
Stage 1 ends because NnNh0 ) NnNh holds, where h = (h0; aih0 ); and so, for some
history h, Nh = N: In Stage 2, if h is an output history of some Step 2.t.b and Nhu = ;
or Nhd = ; then h is a terminal history and the game ends. If Nhu 6= ; and Nhd 6= ;, then
h = (h00; aih00 ; aih0 ) with h
0 = (h00; aih00 ), N
h00
s  Nhs  Nh00s [ fih00 ; ih0g and qhih00 = qh
00
ih
00 + 1,
qh
ih
0 = qh
00
ih
0   1 and qhi = qh00i for all i =2 fih00 ; ih0g (since by denition, qh0i = qh00i ). Then,
the algorithm stops at some Step 2.t.b with output h because Nhu = ; or Nhd = ; (recall
that for any history h of Stage 2, with h being its immediate successor, qh
ih
= k implies
ih 2 Nhs and qhih = 0 implies ih 2 Nh

s ). 
Let H1 and H2 be the sets of histories that are outputs of some steps in Stage 1 and
Stage 2 of  , respectively. In addition, let H be the set of histories that are output of
Stage 1 or Step 2.t.b, for some t 1: Note that H1  H: By the denition of the specic
phase of the algorithm, the set of terminal histories HT of   can be written as
HT = fh 2 H j Nhu = ; or Nhd = ;g:
For each terminal history h 2 HT the output of the game   is o(h) = qh:
Statement 2.1 Let  be an individually rational sequential allotment rule. Then,  
induces ; namely, for all R 2 Rn;
(R) = o(h (?; R)):
Proof of Statement 2.1 Let R 2 Rn be arbitrary, let  = ((R1); : : : ; (Rn)) 2
f0; : : : ; kgn be the prole of tops at R and set h := h (?; R): We rst state and prove
three claims.
Claim 1: If i 2 Nhs ; then  i = qhi .
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Proof of Claim 1: Let i 2 Nhs : Then, by the denitions of the set Nhs at any h and of
the history bh, i = ibh and Rii (bh) =2 fu; dg: If bh 2 H1; it follows that  i = Rii (bh) = qbhi = qhi .
If bh 2 H2; and since bh  h and h is the history induced by the prole of truth-telling
strategies,  i  qbhi + 1 if i 2 Nbhu and  i  qbhi   1 if i 2 Nbhd : Then, since  ii (bh) =2 fu; dg;
 i =
(
q
bh
i + 1 if i 2 Nbhu
q
bh
i   1 if i 2 Nbhd : (33)
Then,
 i = q
h
i ;
where the equality follows from (33) and the denition of qh

i = q
h
i ; where bh im h. 
Claim 2: If i 2 Nhd ; then  i < qhi .
Proof of Claim 2: Let i 2 Nhd : Then, by the denitions of the set Nhd at any h and
the history bh; i = ibh and Rii (bh) = d: If bh 2 H1; it follows that  i < qbhi = qhi : If bh 2 H2;
and since bh  h and i 2 Nbhd , by the denition of Rii ; we have that  i < qbhi   1: But since
q
bh
i   1 = qhi and h is a terminal history of Stage 2, it follows that  i < qhi . 
Claim 3: If i 2 Nhu ; then  i > qhi .
Proof of Claim 3: Let i 2 Nhu : Then, by the denitions of the set Nhu at any h and
the history bh, i = ibh and Rii (bh) = u: If bh 2 H1; it follows that  i > qbhi = qhi : If bh 2 H2;
and since bh  h and i 2 Nbhu , by the denition of Rii ; we have  i > qbhi + 1. But since
q
bh
i + 1 = q
h
i and h
 is a terminal history of Stage 2, it follows that  i > qh

i . 
We proceed with the proof of Statement 2.1 by distinguishing between two cases.
Case 1: Assume Nh

u = ;: By (2.1) in Lemma 2 and Claim 1,
(0Nhd ; Nh

s
) = qh

:
By Claim 2, 0   i < qhi for every i 2 Nhd : Therefore, by strategy-proofness and replace-
ment monotonicity,
(Nhd ; Nh

s
) = qh

:
Hence, (R) = o(h (?; R)):
Case 2: Assume Nh

u 6= ;: Then, Nhd = ; and, by (2.2) in Lemma 2 and Claim 1,

 
kNhu ; Nhs

= qh

:
By Claim 3,  i > qh

i for every i 2 Nhu : Therefore, by strategy-proofness and replacement
monotonicity,

 
Nhu ; Nhs

= qh

:
Hence, (R) = o(h (?; R)): 
Statement 3.1 Let  be an individually rational sequential allotment rule and let R 2 Rn
be a prole. Then, for all i 2 N , the truth-telling strategy Rii is weakly dominant in  .
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Proof of Statement 3.1 Consider agent i with preferences Ri and top allotment  i. Let
Rii be is truth-telling strategy relative to Ri and let 
0
i be any other strategy. We want to
show that, for all  i;
xi = oi(h
 (;; (Rii ;  i)))Rioi(h 

(;; (0i;  i))) = x0i (34)
holds. Let  i be arbitrary. Condition (34) holds trivially if xi = x0i: Assume xi 6= x0i:
Let h0 be the earliest history at which Rii (h
0) 6= 0i(h0) along the equal play induced by
both (Rii ;  i) and (
0
i;  i) up to h
0: We proceed by distinguishing among several cases,
depending on the step of the specic phase of the algorithm for which the history h0 is an
input of, and agent i is called to play at h0.
Case 1: The history h0 is an input of some Step 1.t (i.e., ih0 = i). Then, i 2 NnNh0. Let
q be the allotment that is part of the input information at this step. We distinguish among
three cases.
Subcase 1.1:  i = qi: Then, 
Ri
i (h
0) =  i. Hence, i 2 Nhs for all h  (h0; 0i(h0)); agent i is
not called to play anymore and xi =  i: Thus, (34) holds.
Subcase 1.2:  i > qi. Then, 
Ri
i (h
0) = u. Setting h = (h0; Rii (h
0)), we have that i 2 N hu :
Then, for all h  h; by denition of qhi ;
qi  qhi : (35)
Denote by h (h0; (Rii ;  i)) the terminal history obtained when agents play starting at h
0
according to (Rii ;  i): Because h  h (h0; (Rii ;  i));
qh
0
i  xi: (36)
Since h = (h0; Rii (h
0)) and h0 is an input of some Step 1.t, h is a history of Stage 1 or
Stage 2. Hence, i 2 N hu implies that i 2 Nh
  (h0;(Rii ; i))
u [Nh
  (h0;(Rii ; i))
s : Therefore, by
the denition of Rii ,
xi   i: (37)
By (35), (36) and (37),
qi  xi   i: (38)
On the other hand, since 0i(h
0) 6= Rii (h0) = u, we have that 0i(h0) 2 fqi; dg: Then, by
setting h = (h0; 0i(h
0)); i 2 N hd [ N hs which means that qhi  qi for all h  h: Therefore,
since h  h (h0; (0i;  i));
x0i  qi: (39)
By (38) and (39), single-peakedness of Ri implies that xiRix0i: Thus, (34) holds.
Subcase 1.3:  i < qi: Then, 
Ri
i (h
0) = d. With a symmetric argument to the one used in
Subcase 1.2, we obtain that  i  xi  qi  x0i, and single-peakedness of Ri implies that
xiRix
0
i. Thus, (34) holds.
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Case 2: The history h0 is an input of some Step 2.t.a, and to make the notation consistent
with the one used to dene such step, set h00 := h0 and so ih
00
= i. Then, i 2 Nh00u . Let
qh
00
i be is allotment that is part of the input information at this step. Since i 2 Nh00u and
h00 is a history in the path starting at the empty history ; when agents play according to
(Rii ;  i); agent i has chosen u before h
00. Hence, by denition of Rii ;
qh
00
i + 1   i: (40)
We distinguish between two subcases.
Subcase 2.1:  i = qh
00
i + 1. Then, 
Ri
i (h
00) = qh
00
i + 1 =  i. Hence, i 2 Nhs for all h 
(h00; Rii (h
00)); agent i is not called to play anymore, and so xi =  i: Thus, (34) holds.
Subcase 2.2:  i > qh
00
i + 1. Then, 
Ri
i (h
00) = u and 0i(h
00) = qh
00
i + 1. Hence, i 2 Nhs for all
h  (h00; 0i(h00)); agent i is not called to play anymore, and so x0i = qh00i + 1: Furthermore,
using a similar argument to the one used in Subcase 1.2, it is easy to see that qh
00
i + 1 
xi   i. Since qh00i + 1 = x0i; single-peakedness of Ri implies that xiRix0i: Thus, (34) holds.
Case 3: The history h0 is an input of some Step 2.t.b (i.e., ih0 = i). Then, i 2 Nh0d . Let
qh
0
i be is allotment that is part of the input information at this step. Since i 2 Nh0d and
h0 is a history in the path starting at the empty history ; when agents play according to
(Rii ;  i), agent i has chosen d before h
0. Hence, by the denition of Rii ,
 i  qh0i   1: (41)
We distinguish between two cases.
Subcase 3.1:  i = qh
0
i   1. Then, Rii (h0) = qh0i   1 =  i. Hence, i 2 Nhs for all h 
(h0; Rii (h
0)); agent i is not called to play anymore, and so xi =  i: Thus, (34) holds.
Subcase 3.2:  i < qh
0
i   1. Then, Rii (h0) = d and 0i(h0) = qh0i   1. Hence, i 2 Nhs for all
h  (h0; 0i(h0)); agent i is not called to play anymore, and so x0i = qh0i  1: Furthermore, using
a similar argument to the one used in Subcase 2.2, it is easy to see that  i  xi  qh0i   1.
Since qh
0
i   1 = x0i; single-peakedness of Ri implies that xiRix0i: Thus, (34) holds. 
6.2 Theorem 2
Before starting with the proof of Theorem 2, we present an alternative (and equivalent) way
of dening, along Stage A, the vectors qh and qh as images of  evaluated respectively
at mh and mh, according to either (6) or (7). Remember that the denitions of mh and
mh use respectively the vectors qh
0
and qh
0
, where h0 is the immediate predecessor of h:
It will be convenient to dene instead two vectors ph and ph as images of  evaluated
respectively at l
h
and lh which depend not only on h0 (and its embedded information)
but also on all subhistories up to h (and their embedded information). In Lemma 6 we
will show that ph = qh, ph = qh; l
h
= mh and lh = mh hold, and so both descriptions
35
are equivalent. Therefore, all histories, sets and vectors dened along Stage A using mh
and mh (according to the original denition of the algorithm in Subsection 4.2.1) coincide
with those that would have been obtained from having used instead the vectors l
h
and lh.
However, the more involved description using all subhistories up to h is more helpful for the
proofs of some of the statements required to prove Theorem 2.
For the empty history ;, dene
p; = (k) and p; = (0);
and, for any history h  ;, dene
l
h
j =
8><>:
k if j 2 Nhu [ (NnNh)
p
bh
ibh if j 2 Nhd and j = i
bh
a
ibh if j 2 Nhs and j = ibh
and
lhj =
8><>:
0 if j 2 Nhd [ (NnNh)
p
bh
ibh if j 2 Nhu and j = i
bh
a
ibh if j 2 Nhs and j = ibh;
where, given j, bh is the longest subhistory of h at which j has played at (i.e., j = ibh and,
for all bh  eh  h, j 6= ieh). Then, dene
ph = (l
h
) and ph = (lh):
Let Hm be the set of histories obtained by evaluating  at vectors mh and mh for
histories h in Stage A (as dened in Subsection 4.2.1) and let Hl be the set of histories
that would be obtained by evaluating  at vectors l
h
and lh for histories h in Stage A (as
in Subsection 4.2.1, using l
h
and lh instead of mh and mh, respectively).
Remark 2 We want to emphasize that any history h contains all information needed to
recover the sets Nhu ; N
h
d and N
h
s as well as all choices made by agents along h (specically,
aih0 and aibh) regardless of the vectors used to evaluate ; for instance, from the history
h0 = (;; a4 = 2; a1 = u; a2 = d; a3 = u; a1 = 4; a2 = d; a3 = u); input of Step 2.2.b
in the example of Subsection 4.3, we can obtain in an unambiguous way the sets Nh
0
u =
f3g; Nh0d = f2g; and Nh0s = f1; 4g and all choices made by agents along h (for instance,
a
(;;a4=2;a1=u)
2 = d). In particular, for h 2 Hm [Hl, the corresponding sets Nhu ; Nhd and Nhs
as well as all choices made by agents along h; can be obtained from h itself, independently
of whether the vectors mh and mh or l
h
and lh have been used to generate h:
Claim 1 Let h 2 Hl be the output of Step A.t and let h0 im h (i.e., h = (h0; aih0 )).
Then,
(C1.1) if ih
0 2 Nhu ; l
h
= l
h0
and lh = (lh
0
 ih0 ; p
h0
ih0 ),
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(C1.2) if ih
0 2 Nhd ; l
h
= (l
h0
 ih0 ; p
h0
ih0
) and lh = lh
0
,
(C1.3) if ih
0 2 Nhs ; l
h
= (l
h0
 ih0 ; aih0 ) and l
h = (lh
0
 ih0 ; aih0 ).
Proof of Claim 1
(C1.1) Assume ih
0 2 Nhu : Then, aih0 = u and so, by the denition of Aih0 ; either ih0 2 Nh0u
or ih
0
=2 Nh0. In both cases, lhih0 = l
h0
ih0 = k: Since l
h
and l
h0
only di¤er in the ih
0
-th
component, l
h
= l
h0
: By denition, lh
ih
0 = ph
0
ih
0 . Since lh and lh
0
only di¤er in the ih
0
-th
component, lh = (lh
0
 ih0 ; p
h0
ih0 ).
(C1.2) Assume ih
0 2 Nhd : Then, aih0 = d and so, by the denition of Aih0 , either ih0 2 Nh0d
or ih
0
=2 Nh0. In both cases, lh
ih0 = l
h0
ih0 = 0: Since l
h and lh
0
only di¤er in the ih
0
-th
component, lh = lh
0
: By denition, l
h
ih0 = p
h0
ih0
: Since l
h
and l
h0
only di¤er in the ih
0
-th
component, l
h
= (l
h0
 ih0 ; p
h0
ih0
).
(C1.3) Assume ih
0 2 Nhs : Then, aih0 2 fph0ih0 ; : : : ; ph
0
ih0g: Hence, l
h
ih
0 = lh
ih
0 = aih0 : Since l
h
and l
h0
and lh and lh
0
di¤er only in the ih
0
-th component, which is equal to aih0 ; we have
l
h
= (l
h0
 ih0 ; aih0 ) and l
h = (lh
0
 ih0 ; aih0 ): 
Lemma 3 Let h = (h0; aih0 ) 2 Hl be the output of Step A.t and assume Nh 6= N . Then,
(3.1)
P
i2N l
h
i  k,
(3.2) ph
0
i  phi for all i 6= ih0,
(3.3) if ih
0 2 Nhs ; aih0 = phih0 ,
(3.4) if ih
0 2 Nhu ; ph0ih0 = phih0 ,
(3.5) if i 2 Nhs nfih0g; aibh = ph
0
ibh = phibh where bh is such that i = ibh,
(3.6)
P
i2N l
h
i  k,
(3.7) ph
i
 ph0
i
for all i 6= ih0,
(3.8) if ih
0 2 Nhs ; aih0 = phih0 ,
(3.9) if ih
0 2 Nhd ; ph0ih0 = phih0 ,
(3.10) if i 2 Nhs nfih0g; aibh = ph
0
ibh = phibh where bh is such that i = ibh.
Proof of Lemma 3
(3.1) Since l
h
i = k for all i 2 NnNh 6= ;; the denition of l
h
impliesP
i2N
l
h
i  k:
(3.2) Let i 6= ih0 : By denition of ih0, ih0 =2 Nh0s : We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Assume ih
0 2 Nh0u [ (NnNh0): Then, l
h0
ih0 = k  l
h
ih0 : Since, by Claim 1, l
h
 ih0 = l
h0
 ih0
holds, by replacement monotonicity and the denitions of ph and ph
0
;
ph
0
i  phi for all i 6= ih
0
:
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Case 2: Assume ih
0 2 Nh0d : Then, ih0 2 Nhd [Nhs and by denition of l
h
ih0 ;
l
h
ih0 =
(
ph
0
ih
0 if ih
0 2 Nhd
aih0 if i
h0 2 Nhs :
Hence, by e¢ ciency and (3.1), l
h
ih0  ph0ih0 = ih0 (l
h0
)  lh0ih0 . Since, by Claim 1, l
h
 ih0 = l
h0
 ih0
holds, by replacement monotonicity and the denitions of ph and ph
0
;
ph
0
i  phi for all i 6= ih
0
:
(3.3) By the denition of l
h
; ih
0 2 Nhs implies l
h
ih0 = aih0 . By e¢ ciency of  and (3.1),
ph
ih0 = ih0 (l
h
)  aih0 : (42)
By Claim 1 and since aih0 belongs to fph0ih0 ; : : : ; ph
0
ih0g, l
h
 ih0 = l
h0
 ih0 , l
h
ih0 = aih0  ph
0
ih0 =
ih0 (l
h0
)  lh0ih0 , where the last inequality holds by e¢ ciency and (3.1). By strategy-proofness,
ph
ih
0 = ih0 (l
h
)  aih0 : (43)
By (42) and (43),
aih0 = p
h
ih
0 :
(3.4) Assume ih
0 2 Nhu : By Claim 1, l
h0
= l
h
and so ph
0
= ph.
(3.5) Let i 2 Nhs and i 6= ih0 : Let bh be the history at which i has played for the
last time before h and let h be the immediate successor of bh on the path towards h (i.e.,bh im h im    im h0 im h): Then, i = ibh 2 Nhs . Therefore, by (3.3),
a
ibh = phibh : (44)
By (3.2), and since for any history h such that h  h  h; ibh 2 Nhs and ibh 6= ih,
lh
ibh = l
h
ibh = aibh = phibh  ph
0
ibh  phibh ; (45)
where the rst equality follows from the denitions of lh and l
h
, the second equality from
(44), and the two inequalities follow from (3.2), successively applied in the case of the rst
inequality. Furthermore, by e¢ ciency of  and (3.1),
lh
ibh = l
h
ibh  ibh(l
h
) = ph
ibh :
Therefore, by (45),
a
ibh = ph
0
ibh = phibh :
(3.6) By denition of lh; we have that, for all i 2 Nhd [ (NnNh),
lhi = 0: (46)
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Let i 2 Nhu : We distinguish between two cases. First, assume there exists bh  h0 such that
i 2 Nbhu , i 2 Nhu for all bh  h  h and i does not play at h: Then,
lhi = p
bh
i  phi ; (47)
where the equality follows from the denition of lh and the inequality from (3.4) and (3.2).
Assume now that bh = h0 (because i = ih0). Then, by the denition of lh and (3.4),
lhi = p
h0
i = p
h
i : (48)
Let i 2 Nhs . We distinguish between two cases. First, assume i 6= ih0 and let bh be such that
i
bh = i: Then,
lhi = aibh = phi ; (49)
where the rst equality follows from the denition of lh and the second one from (3.5).
Assume now that i = ih
0
: Then, since bh = h0; the denition of lh and (3.3) imply that
lhi = aih0 = p
h
i : (50)
Therefore, by (46) to (50), for all i 2 N;
lhi  phi .
Hence, by feasibility of ph; X
i2N
lhi  k:
The proofs of (3.7), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) are symmetric to the proofs of (3.2), (3.3),
(3.4) and (3.5), and so they are omitted. 
Lemma 4 Let h = (h0; aih0 ) 2 Hl be the output of Step A.t and assume Nh 6= N . Then,
(4.1) if ih
0 2 Nhu ; phih0 = phih0 = ph
0
ih0 ,
(4.2) if ih
0 2 Nhd , phih0 = phih0 = ph
0
ih
0 ,
(4.3) if i 2 Nhs , phi = phi = aibh where bh is such that i = ibh,
(4.4) if i 2 Nh0d nfih0g; then phi = ph0i ,
(4.5) if i 2 Nh0u nfih0g; then phi = ph
0
i
.
Proof of Lemma 4
(4.1) Let ih
0 2 Nhu . Then, by (C1.1) in Claim 1,
l
h
= l
h0
and lh = (lh
0
 ih0 ; p
h0
ih0 ): (51)
By denition of ph and ph
0
;
ph = ph
0
: (52)
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By (3.6) in Lemma 3, (51), and e¢ ciency of ,
ih0 (l
h)  ph0
ih0 :
If ih0 (l
h) > ph
0
ih0 ; then
ih0 (l
h0
 ih0 ; p
h0
ih
0 ) = ih0 (l
h) > ph
0
ih
0 > ph
0
ih
0 = ih0 (l
h0);
where the second strict inequality follows from the denition of ih
0
: But, by single-peakedness,
it contradicts strategy-proofness of . Then, by (52) and the denition of ph;
ph
ih0
= ih0 (l
h) = ph
0
ih
0 = ph
ih
0 ;
which is the statement in (4.1).
(4.2) The proof proceeds as in (4.1), using symmetric arguments.
(4.3) Let i 2 Nhs and let bh be such that i = ibh: If bh 6= h0 the proof follows from (3.5) and
(3.10) in Lemma 3. If bh = h0 the proof follows from (3.3) and (3.8) in Lemma 3.
(4.4) The proof is by induction on the length of the histories.
Assume that h = (;; ai;) is a history of length 1: Then, h0 = ; and Nh0d = ;: Therefore,
(4.4) holds trivially.
Assume that (4.4) holds for all h  h. We prove that it holds for h:
Let i 2 Nh0d nfih0g: Then, by the denition of l
h0
; l
h0
i = p
bh0
i
where bh0 is such that i = i bh0 :
Let h be such that h
0
= bh0 and h  h (i.e., bh0 im h  h). By (4.2),
p
bh0
i
= ph
0
i
= ph
i
= phi : (53)
By the induction hypothesis and the denition of h, and since i 2 Nhd and i 6= ih for all
h  h  h0,
phi = p
h0
i : (54)
Hence,
l
h
i = l
h0
i = p
h
i = p
h0
i ; (55)
where the rst equality follows from i 6= ih0 ; the second follows from (53) and lh0i = p bh0i ; and
the third from (54). Therefore, by (3.2) in Lemma 3, e¢ ciency of  and (3.1) in Lemma 3,
and (55),
ph
0
i  phi  l
h
i = p
h0
i :
Thus,
phi = p
h0
i :
(4.5) The proof proceeds as in (4.4), using symmetric arguments. 
Lemma 5 Let h 2 Hl be the output of Step A.t. Then, Nh 6= N:
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Proof of Lemma 5 If h = ; the statement follows trivially. Assume that h is a non-
empty history and, to obtain a contradiction, that Nh = N: Then, by the denition of
Stage A, there exists h  h such that Nh = Nhu [Nhs [Nhd = Nnfihg. By denition of ih
ph
ih
< ph
ih
:
Without loss of generality, we can assume that agent ih is not called to play between h and
h. Then, since ph is feasible, there exists i 6= ih such that
phi < p
h
i
:
Since Nhu [Nhs [Nhd = N=fihg; i 2 Nhu [Nhs [Nhd . We can apply now Lemmata 3 and 4 to
h; because Nh 6= N:
Case 1: If i 2 Nhs we obtain a contradiction with (4.3).
Case 2: If i 2 Nhu we obtain a contradiction with either (4.1) or (4.1), (4.5) and (3.2).
Case 3: If i 2 Nhd we obtain a contradiction with either (4.2) or (4.2), (4.4) and (3.7). 
Observe that by Lemma 5 the hypothesis that Nh 6= N in Lemmata 3 and 4 is without
loss of generality. Hence, those two lemmata apply to any history in Stage A, or output of
Stage A. Note that in the proof of Lemma 5 we have used Lemmata 3 and 4, applied to
history h; where Nh 6= N:
Lemma 6 Let h be a history such that h 2 Hm \Hl. Then,
l
h
= mh and lh = mh.
Moreover, Hm = Hl:
Proof of Lemma 6 The proof is by induction on the length of the histories. The induction
hypothesis is that for all t  1; the set of histories of length t in Hm and Hl coincide and
if h 2 Hm has length t, then
l
h
= mh and lh = mh:
If t = 1; then the induction hypothesis holds trivially from the denitions.
Assume that the induction hypothesis holds for all t < t: We will prove that it holds for
t:
Let h = (h0; aih0 ) be a history of length t in Hm (or Hl): Since h
0 has length t   1; by
the induction hypothesis, h0 is a history in Hm and Hl and
l
h0
= mh
0
and lh
0
= mh
0
;
which means that
qh
0
= ph
0
and qh
0
= ph
0
:
Then, h = (h0; aih0 ) is a history of length t in Hl (or Hm).
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Now, we prove that l
h
= mh holds.
If i 2 Nhu [ (NnNh); l
h
= mh holds by their denitions.
If i 2 Nhs nfih0g; by (3.5) in Lemma 3 and Lemma 5, aibh = ph
0
ibh where i = i
bh: Therefore,
mhi = q
h0
i = p
h0
i = aibh = l
h
i :
If i 2 Nhd nfih0g; qh0i = ph0i by the induction hypothesis. Moreover, i 2 Nh0d nfih0g and by
the denition of bh; i = ibh and i 2 Nbhd nfih0g: By (4.4) in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, phi = ph0i :
By (4.2) in Lemma 4 applied to i = ibh; ph0
ibh = p
bh
ibh : Therefore,
mhi = q
h0
i = p
h0
i = p
bh
i
= l
h
i :
If i = ih
0
and i 2 Nhs ; then bh = h0 and, by their denitions,
mhi = aih0 = aibh = l
h
i :
If i = ih
0
and i 2 Nhd ; then bh = h0 and, by their denitions,
mhi = q
h0
i
= ph
0
i
= p
bh
ibh = l
h
i :
Therefore,
l
h
= mh:
The proof that lh = mh holds as well proceeds as the proof of l
h
= mh, using symmetric
arguments.
Therefore, the sets of actions available to agent ih
0
if we use l and l or m and m coincide.
Hence, h = (h0; aih0 ) is the same history and belongs to Hl and Hm: 
Lemma 7 Let h  h be two histories in Stage A (h may be itself the output of Stage
A): Then,
(7.1) if i 2 Nhu and i = ih
0
= ih
0
, qhi < q
h
i ;
(7.2) if i 2 Nhd and i = ih
0
= ih
0
qh
i
> qh
i
,
(7.3) if i 2 Nhs , qhi = qhi = qhi = qhi .
Proof of Lemma 7
(7.1) Assume i 2 Nhu and i = ih
0
= ih
0
: Without loss of generality we can assume that
i = ih
0
does not play between h
0
and h0: By Lemma 6,
qh
i
= qhi = q
h0
i
< qh
0
i = q
h
i ,
where the rst equality follows from (4.1) in Lemma 4 and i = ih
0
, the second follows from
iterate application of (4.5) in Lemma 4 (if needed) and i 6= ieh for all h  eh  h0 (if any), the
strict inequality follows from the denition of ih
0
and i = ih
0
and the last equality follows
from (4.1) in Lemma 4 and i = ih
0
:
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(7.2) The proof is symmetric to the proof of (7.1).
(7.3) The proof follows from (4.3) in Lemma 4. 
Lemma 8 Let h be the output of Stage A and let h  h: Then,
(8.1) qhi = aibh for all i 2 Nhs where bh is such that i = ibh,
(8.2) qhi = q
bh
i for all i 2 Nhu where bh is such that i = ibh,
(8.3) qhi = q
bh
i
for all i 2 Nhd where bh is such that i = ibh,
(8.4) qhi  qhi for all i 2 Nhu [Nhs where i = ih and aih = u,
(8.5) qhi  qhi for all i 2 Nhd [Nhs where i = ih

and aih = d:
Proof of Lemma 8
(8.1) The proof follows from Lemma 6 and (4.3) in Lemma 4.
(8.2) Let i = ibh 2 Nhu and let h be such that bh im h  h: Since ibh 2 Nhu and ibh 2 Nhu ;
by (4.1) and (4.5) in Lemma 4, and by Lemma 6,
q
bh
i = q
h
i = q
h
i
= qh
i
:
Now, since h is the output of Stage A, qh
i
= qhi . Hence,
qhi = q
bh
i :
(8.3) The proof proceeds as the proof of (8.2), using symmetric arguments.
(8.4) Let i 2 Nhu [Nhs ; where i = ih and aih = u. We distinguish between the two sets
to which i can belong to.
Case 1: i 2 Nhu . By (8.1), we can assume without loss of generality that h is the last
history at which agent i has played; namely, h = bh. Then, qhi = qhi follows from (8.2) in
Lemma 8.
Case 2: i 2 Nhs . Then, since i = ih and aih = u, h  bh  h. Consider h such that
h im h  bh: Then,
qh

i = q
h
i = q
h
i
 qbh
i
;
where the rst two equalities follow from (4.1) in Lemma 4, i = ih

and Lemma 6, and the
inequality follows directly from Lemma 6 and (4.5) in Lemma 4 if i does not play between h
and bh, and from (4.5) in Lemma 4 and (8.1) in Lemma 8 otherwise (perhaps, after applying
them iteratively). Since i 2 Nhs ; by Lemma 6 and (4.3) in Lemma 4,
qhi = a
bh
i 2 fqbhi ; : : : ; qbhi g:
Thus,
qh

i  qhi :
(8.5) The proof proceeds as the proof of (8.4), using symmetric arguments. 
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Proof of Theorem 2 It follows from the three statements that we will present and prove
successively. Along the proof we will use the statement of Lemma 6.
Statement 1.2 Let  be a sequential allotment rule. Then, the extensive game form  
is well dened and nite.
Proof of Statement 1.2 By Statement 1.1 it will be su¢ cient to show that Stage A of
the game is well dened and nite. We rst argue that the agents that are called to play
along Stage A are uniquely identied and well dened.
Consider Step A.t, with t 0, with input h0 and qh0 6= qh0. If t=0 and so h0 = ;;
i; = min<fi 2 N j q;i < q;i g is well dened. If t 1 and so h0 6= ;, mh
0 6= mh0. Hence,
NnNh0s 6= ;: Since qh0 and qh0 are feasible,
P
i2N q
h0
i
=
P
i2N q
h0
i = k: Hence, by (7.3) in
Lemma 7, there exists at least one i 2 NnNh0s such that qh0i < qh
0
i , and so i
h0 = min<fi 2
NnNh0s j qh0i < qh
0
i g is well dened.
As in the proof of Statement 1.1, it is easy to see that the sets of agents Nhu ; N
h
d and N
h
s
are well dened: The proof that Stage A is nite follows from Lemma 8 and the following
two facts: (i) if qh
0
i = k and i = i
h0 2 Nh0u ; then i 2 Nhs and (ii) if qh0i = 0 and i = ih
0 2 Nh0d ;
then i 2 Nhs . 
We now proceed to state and prove that   OSP-implements :
Fix  and let   be the game dened in Section 4. We decompose a behavioral strategy
prole  in   into  = (A; B), where A is the restriction of  to histories in Stage A
and B is the restriction of  to histories in Stage B.
Statement 2.2 Let  be a sequential allotment rule. Then,   induces ; namely, for
all R 2 Rn;
(R) = o(h (;; R)):
Proof of Statement 2.2 Let R 2 Rn be arbitrary and let  = ((R1); : : : ; (Rn)) 2
f0; : : : ; kgn be the prole of tops at R. Let hA be the output of Stage A under RA and set
A := hA ; so that qA := qh
A
: Then, by denition of RA;  i = q
A
i for all i 2 NAs ;  i > qAi
for all i 2 NAu and  i < qAi for all i 2 NAd . Hence, R 2 DA ; where DA is dened as in
Remark 1. Thus,  2 DA and
(R) = A (R) = o(h 
A
(hA ; RB)) = o(h
 (?; R));
where the second equality follows from Remark 1 and Statement 2.1, after identifying hA
with the input history of Stage B. 
Statement 3.2 Let  be a sequential allotment rule and let R 2 Rn be a prole. Then,
for all i 2 N , the truth-telling strategy Rii is weakly dominant in  .
Proof of Statement 3.2 Consider agent i with preferences Ri and top allotment  i. Let
Rii be is truth-telling strategy relative to Ri and let 
0
i be any other strategy. We want to
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show that, for all  i;
xi = oi(h
 (;; (Rii ;  i))Rioi(h 

(;; (0i;  i)) = x0i (56)
holds. Let  i be arbitrary. Condition (56) holds trivially if xi = x0i: Assume xi 6= x0i:
Let h0 be the earliest history at which Rii (h
0) 6= 0i(h0) along the equal play induced by
both ( ii ;  i) and (i;  i) up to h
0: We proceed by distinguishing among several cases,
depending on the step of the algorithm for which the history h0 is an input of, and agent i
is called to play at h0.
Case 1: The history h0 is an input of some Step A.t (i.e., ih0 = i). Then, qh0
i
< qh
0
i : We
distinguish among three subcases.
Subcase 1.1: qh
0
i
  i  qh0i . Then, Rii (h0) =  i. Hence, i 2 Nhs for all h  (h0; Rii (h0)); i is
not called to play anymore, and xi =  i: Thus, (56) holds.
Subcase 1.2: qh
0
i <  i: Then, 
Ri
i (h
0) = u: Let h be the output of Stage A when ( ii ;  i)
is played starting at h0: Therefore, (h0; Rii (h
0))  h and i 2 N hu [ N hs . By (8.4) in Lemma
8, qh
0
i  qhi . Then, qh0i  qhi  qh
  (h0;(Rii ; i))
i = xi,
22 where the last inequality holds
because qeh0i  qehi for all i 2 Neh0u [ Neh0s if eh0 is a history in Stage B. Since Rii (h0) = u;
i 2 Nh 

(h0;(Rii ; i))
u [Nh
  (h0;(Rii ; i))
s : Therefore, by the denition of Rii , xi   i: Thus,
qh
0
i  xi   i: (57)
On the other hand, and since 0i(h
0) 6= Rii (h0), we have 0i(h0) 2 fqh0i ; : : : ; qh
0
i g or 0i(h0) =
d: Let eh be the output of Stage A when (0i;  i) is played starting at h0: Therefore,
(h0; 0i(h
0))  eh; and i 2 Nehd [ Nehs . Then, by (8.1) and (8.5) in Lemma 8, qehi  qh0i  qh0i :
Then,
x0i = q
h 

(h0;(Rii ; i))
i  qehi  qh0i ; (58)
where the rst inequality holds because qehi  qeh0i for all i 2 Neh0u [ Neh0s if eh0 is a history in
Stage B: Therefore, by (57) and (58),
x0i  qh
0
i  xi   i:
Therefore, by single-peakedness, xiRix0i: Thus, (56) holds.
Subcase 1.3:  i < qh
0
i
:With a symmetric argument to the one used in Subcase 1.2, we obtain
that  i  xi  qh0i  x0i: By single-peakedness, xiRix0i: Thus, (56) holds.
Case 2: The history h0 is an input of some step at Stage B. In this case the proof is as the
one used to prove Statement 3.1. 
22Remember that h 
GF
(h0; (Rii ;  i)) denotes the terminal history that follows when agents play
(Rii ;  i) in the game  
 starting at h0:
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7 Appendix 2: Denition of Sequential Allotment Rules
We dene the class of sequential allotment rules for the discrete division problem as the nat-
ural extension of its denition for the continuous division problem, presented in Barberà,
Jackson and Neme (1997). A sequential allotment rule uses reference allotments to sequen-
tially allocate the good similar to how the uniform allocation rule does with the egalitarian
allotment as reference.23 We closely follow the description of Barberà, Jackson and Neme
(1997), where the reader will nd detailed explanations of a sequential allotment rule.
Denition 2 The function g : X  Rn ! X  Rn is a sequential adjustment function
relative to qL 2 X and qH 2 X if the following are true for any (qt; R) 2 X Rn such that
(qt; R) = g(qt 1; R) =: gt(q0; R) for some t  1,24 where q0 = qH if Pj2N (Rj)  k and
q0 = qL if
P
j2N (Rj) < k:
(i) qti = (Ri) if (k  
P
j2N (Rj))
 
qt 1i   (Ri)
  0:
(ii)
 
qti   qt 1i

(k  Pj2N (Rj))  0 if (k  Pj2N (Rj))  qt 1i   (Ri) > 0:
(iii) If min f(R0i); (Ri)g > qt 1i and
P
j2N (Rj)  k or max f(R0i); (Ri)g < qt 1i andP
j2N (Rj) < k; then g(q
t 1; R) = g(qt 1; (R0i; R i)):
(iv) Let (q0n; (R0i; R i)) = g
n(q0; (R0i; R i)) and (q
n; R) = gn(q0; R)): Then,
if (R0i)  (Ri) and
P
j2N (Rj)  k; then q0ni0  qni0 for i0 6= i,
if (R0i)  (Ri) and
P
j2N (Rj) < k; then q
0n
i0  qni0 for i0 6= i.
Denition 3 A rule  : Rn ! X is a sequential allotment rule if there exist qL; qH 2 X
and a sequential adjustment function g : X Rn ! X Rn relative to qL; qH such that:
((R); R) =
(
gn(qH ; R) if
P
j2N (Rj)  k
gn(qL; R) if
P
j2N (Rj) < k:
A sequential allotment rule follows a procedure of at most n steps, where each step uses
two reference allotments that may di¤er, depending on whether the sum of the tops is smaller
or larger than the amount to be allotted. Along the procedure, the reference allotments
evolve according to the iterative application of the sequential adjustment function g:
Let  : Rn ! X be a sequential allotment rule and let R 2 Rn. Then, the allotment
(R) can be obtained as the outcome of the following algorithm.
Step 1: Input: k 2 N+ and prole R 2 Rn with a vector of tops  = ((R1); : : : ; (Rn)):
Set q0 = (0) and q0 = (k):
If
P
j2N  j = k set (R) =  : Stop.
If
P
j2N  j > k set i(R) =  i for all i 2 fj 2 N j  j  q0i g := S1: Compute K1 =
k  Pj2S1 j(R): If S1 = ; stop and set (R) =  : Otherwise, go to Step 2.
23For the continuous division problem, Sprumont (1991) characterizes the uniform allocation rule as the
unique rule that satises strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency and anonymity.
24The notation gt denotes g composed with itself t-times, with g0(q;R) = (q;R):
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If
P
j2N  j < k set i(R) =  i for all i 2 fj 2 N j  j  q0i g := S1: Compute K1 =
k  Pj2S1 j(R): If S1 = ; stop and set (R) =  : Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step t+1: Input: Kt 2 R++, St ( N , and prole RNnSt with a vector of tops NnSt. Set
qt = (St ;0NnSt) and q
t = (St ;kNnSt):
If
P
j2St  j > Kt set i(R) =  i for all i 2 fj 2 NnSt j  j  qtig := St+1: Compute
Kt+1 = Kt  
P
j2St+1 j(R): If St+1 = ; stop and set
i(R) =
(
 i if i 2 St
qti if i 2 NnSt:
Otherwise, go to Step t+2.
If
P
j2St  j < Kt set i(R) =  i to all i 2 fj 2 NnSt j  j  qtig = St+1: Compute
Kt+1 = Kt  
P
j2St+1 j(R): If St+1 = ; stop and set
i(R) =
(
 i if i 2 St
qt
i
if i 2 NnSt:
Otherwise, go to Step t+2.
Observe that the procedure stops at some Step t0 such that St0 = ;: Example 2 illustrates
this procedure.
Example 2: Let n = 5, k = 35; and  be given. Let q0 = (0) = (1; 1; 7; 10; 16) and
q0 = (k) = (4; 6; 8; 9; 8):
Consider rst the prole of tops  = (0; 2; 6; 9; 12): Then,
P
j2N  j = 29 < 35: In
Step 1, S1 = fj 2 N j  j  q0jg = f2g; 2(R) = 2; and K1 = 33: In Step 2, set
q1 = (0; 2; 0; 0; 0) and q1 = (35; 2; 35; 35; 35); and assume q1 = (0; 2; 7; 10; 16): Since
 1 +  3 +  4 +  5 = 27 < 33; S2 = fj 2 f1; 3; 4; 5g j  j  q1jg = f1g; 1(R) = 0;
and K2 = 33: In Step 3, set q2 = (0; 2; 0; 0; 0) and q2 = (0; 2; 35; 35; 35); and assume
q2 = (0; 2; 7; 10; 16): Since  3 +  4 +  5 = 27 < 33; S3 = fj 2 f3; 4; 5g j  j  q1jg = ; and
stop with (R) = (0; 2; 7; 10; 16):
Consider now the prole of tops  = (2; 8; 5; 12; 17): Then,
P
j2N  j = 44 > 35: In Step
1, S1 = fj 2 N j  j  q0jg = f1; 3g; 1(R) = 2; 3(R) = 5 and K1 = 28: In Step 2,
set q1 = (2; 35; 5; 35; 35) and q1 = (2; 0; 5; 0; 0), and assume q1 = (2; 7; 5; 10; 11): Since
 2 +  4 +  5 = 37 > 28; S2 = fj 2 f2; 4; 5g j  j  q1jg = ; and stop with (R) =
(2; 7; 5; 10; 11): 
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